Interpretive Entrepreneurs by Durkee, Melissa J.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
1-1-2021 
Interpretive Entrepreneurs 
Melissa J. Durkee 
Associate Dean for International Programs, Director of the Dean Rusk International Law Center & Allen 
Post Professor University of Georgia School of Law, mjdurkee@uga.edu 
University of Georgia School of Law 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 2021-3 
 
Repository Citation 
Melissa J. Durkee, Interpretive Entrepreneurs , 107 Va. L. Rev. 431 (2021), 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1373 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ 
Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please contact 
tstriepe@uga.edu. 
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW




Private actors interpret legal norms, a phenomenon I call "interpretive
entrepreneurship." The phenomenon is particularly significant in the
international context, where many disputes are not subject to judicial
resolution and there is no official system of precedent. Interpretation
can affect the meaning of laws over time. For this reason, it can be a
form of "post hoc" international lawmaking, worth studying alongside
other forms of international lobbying and norm entrepreneurship by
private actors. The Article identifies and describes the phenomenon
through a series of case studies that show how, why, and by whom it
unfolds. The examples focus on entrepreneurial activity by business
actors and cast a wide net, examining aircraft finance, space mining,
modern slavery, and investment law. As a matter of theory, this process-
based account suggests that international legal interpretation involves
contests for meaning among diverse groups of actors, giving credence
to critical and constructivist views of international legal interpretation.
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As a practical matter, the case studies show that interpretive
entrepreneurship s an influence tool and a driver of legal change.
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INTRODUCTION
Uber is a "disruptor."' While the term generally refers to disruption of
a business model, Uber's disruption extends to the law.2 Rather than
submit to the restrictive rules of the taxicab industry, Uber read itself out
of them, relying on its own aggressive legal interpretations to justify its
plans.3 It then launched its business, entrenched itself in popular culture,
gathered political power, and became "too big to ban."4 Uber's success in
defining itself out of taxicab regulations is a high profile example of a
phenomenon I call "interpretive entrepreneurship."5
Interpretive entrepreneurship is the act of developing the law by
interpreting it. Interpretive entrepreneurs might exploit legal uncertainty
to pursue business plans, as Uber did, and change the regulatory
environment along the way.6 Or they may shop around favorable
interpretations to regulators, or publicize reputation-friendly
interpretations to investors and the public.7 Through each mode,
interpretive entrepreneurs seek to influence legal development.8 A more
familiar way to think about private sector influence over legal
Clayton M. Christensen, Michael E. Raynor & Rory McDonald, What Is Disruptive
Innovation?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Dec. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-
innovation [https://perna.cc/S84Z-8RE5] ("'Disruption' describes a process whereby a
smaller company with fewer resources is able to successfully challenge established incumbent
businesses."); see also Andr6 Spicer, Disruptor Has Become a Dirty Word. And Not Just When
Applied to Donald Trump, The Guardian, (June 11, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2019/jun/11 /disruptor-dirty-word-donald-trump-scientists-engineers
[https://perma.cc/P34D-HGY5] ("Now being [a] 'disruptor' is a positive. Entrepreneurs such
as Elon Musk are lauded when they seek to 'disrupt' established industries .... ").
2 See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 383, 398 n.63 (2017) (describing how Uber relied on changing the law as part of its
business plan).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 401-02.
5 While Uber's interpretations have often been successful in the United States, these results
have not consistently been replicated elsewhere. See, e.g., Case C-434/15, Asociaci6n
Profesional Elite Taxi v. Uber Sys. Spain SL, ECLI:EU:C:2017:981 (Dec. 20, 2017) (defining
Uber as a "service in the field of transport" under European Union Law and thus subject to
normal regulation as a taxi). This observation builds on and departs from an account developed
by Elizabeth Pollman and Jordan Barry, who define "regulatory entrepreneurship" as "[w]ell-
funded, scalable, and highly connected startup businesses" who "target state and local laws
and litigate them in the political sphere instead of in court." Pollman & Barry, supra note 2, at
383. This Article identifies Pollman and Barry's legal disruption as one mode of
entrepreneurial interpretation.
6 See discussion infra Subsection II.A.1.
See discussion infra Subsection II.A.2.
s See discussion infra Section II.C.
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development is through the lobbying that surrounds new lawmaking
efforts.9 Interpretive entrepreneurship is the ex post companion to these
ex ante lobbying efforts. While legal scholarship has focused on the ex
ante lobbying,'0 the ex post interpretative role is underappreciated. As this
Article shows, both activities deserve attention.
To sharpen the account and clarify the stakes, the Article makes two
framing choices. First, while many actors can participate in legal
interpretation, the Article focuses on interpretive entrepreneurship by
business actors. This choice directs attention to the fact that some of the
same actors may participate in both lobbying and interpretation as
separate portions of a unified influence campaign to advance business
agendas." Second, the Article focuses its account on interpretation of
international legal norms. While interpretive entrepreneurship may take
place at any level of legal ordering, from the municipal to the
international, interpretive entrepreneurship is particularly significant as a
transnational phenomenon.'2 This is due to the growing importance of
9 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying Regulation: History Through 1954,
in The Lobbying Manual 5 (William V. Luneburg, Thomas M. Susman & Rebecca H. Gordon
eds., 4th ed. 2009) (history of U.S. federal lobbying laws); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political
Corruption, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 118, 121, 134-42 (2010) (reviewing efforts to redress the
"financial vulnerabilities of democracy," including through campaign-finance reform efforts);
Thomas M. Susman & William V. Luneburg, History of Lobbying Disclosure Reform
Proposals Since 1955, in The Lobbying Manual, supra, at 23 (history of U.S. federal lobbying
reform proposals).
10 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, A Public Finance Model for
Lobbying: Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of Democracy, 13 Election L.J.
75, 87-90 (2014) (proposing reforms that would subsidize lobbying activity by public interest
groups); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 Stan. L. Rev.
191, 226-36 (2012) (proposing a "national economic welfare" rationale for lobbying
regulation); Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1131, 1199
(2016) (asserting that current lobbying regulation and practice violates the First Amendment's
Petition Clause); Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13 Election L.J. 4, 6
(2014) (noting that the scope of the constitutional lobbying right is unclear).
1I See, e.g., discussion infra Subsection II.A.1 (describing how industry efforts to develop
the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment began at the
drafting stage and continue with efforts on implementation, interpretation, and compliance).
12 Consider the problem of interpretation in the international context. For example, the key
operative provision of the Paris Agreement on climate change provides that "[e]ach Party shall
prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it
intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of
achieving the objectives of such contributions." Paris Agreement art. 4, ¶ 2, Dec. 12, 2015,
T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (emphasis added). What is the meaning of the italicized portion? Have
parties obligated themselves to engage in mitigation measures? For a careful defense of this
interpretation, see Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunee & Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate
Change Law 231 (2017) (arguing that the imperative "shall" relates both to the national
434
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transnational commerce combined with the lack of courts with general
jurisdiction and a system of precedent on the international level.' 3
Conventional accounts of international legal interpretation focus on
interpretive doctrine rather than on the process of interpretation and the
multiplicity of actors involved.'4 But related literatures show that
interpretive participants and processes matter. For example, debates in the
contributions and the pursuit of mitigation measures). Or have parties merely committed to
"pursuing" measures, with no obligation to actually carry them out? See, e.g., Richard Falk,
"Voluntary" International Law and the Paris Agreement, Commentary on Global Issues (Jan.
16, 2016), https://richardfalk.wordpress.com/2016/01/16/voluntary-international-law-and-
the-paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/ZTH6-C3UV] (arguing that the Paris Agreement is
"voluntary" international law with no binding commitments). Which reading is best? Which
is law? The Paris Agreement does not designate any international court or tribunal as a neutral
arbitrator of disputes. Even if it had done so, international law has no official system of
precedent o carry one tribunal's interpretation forward with the force of law. See Harlan Grant
Cohen, Theorizing Precedent in International Law, in Interpretation in International Law 268,
269 (Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor eds., 2015) [hereinafter Cohen,
Theorizing Precedent].
In the United States, federal courts will interpret treaties, deferring in some instances to the
executive branch. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over
International Law, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1201, 1204 (2018) (observing that "Presidents ... have
come to dominate the creation, alteration, and termination of international law for the United
States"); see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 326(2) (Am. L. Inst. 1986) (noting that courts "give great weight to an interpretation made
by the Executive Branch"). But many treaties do not offer private rights and so their meanings
are not litigated in the United States. See id. § 907 cmt. a ("International
agreements ... generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action
in domestic courts .... "); see also United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 389 (6th Cir.
2001) ("As a general rule, however, international treaties do not create rights that are privately
enforceable in the federal courts."). Even if they are litigated in the United States, the
interpretation produced by a U.S. court is just one competing interpretation on the international
stage. Treaty meaning is not often litigated before international tribunals like the International
Court of Justice. See Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice 5 (Univ.
Chi. John M. Olin L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 233, 2004), https://chicagounbound.
uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1 499&context=law_and_economics
[https://perma.cc/77P8-RYK3] (noting that states frequently refuse to submit to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice).
13 Cohen, Theorizing Precedent, supra note 12, at 268, 269-70 ("International law
today . . . generally denies international precedents doctrinal force."); see also sources cited
infra Section I.A. (developing these points).
" Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor, Playing the Game of Interpretation: On Meaning and
Metaphor in International Law, in Interpretation in International Law, supra note 12, at 3, 3-
4, 8 (identifying these gaps and setting out to remedy this shortcoming by "highlight[ing] the
practice and process of interpretation as well as the professional identity of those involved");
see also James Crawford, Foreword to Interpretation in International Law, supra note 12, at v,
v ("Legal scholarship has tended to tackle the issue of interpretation either from an abstract,
quasi-philosophical perspective, or by focusing on the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties .... ").
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United States concern which questions are too "political" for the judiciary
to resolve, and which branch of government is best suited to decide
matters of foreign affairs.15 They rest on the assumption that the
interpreter and the forum can affect the outcome.
The Article directs attention to processes of international legal
interpretation, and particularly to private sector influences in that process.
It relies on the socio-legal method of grounding theoretical insights in
descriptive analysis.16 Its analysis suggests that business entities are
involved in a potentially vast amount of international interpretive activity
which helps shape the development of international legal norms.
The Article makes three principal contributions. First, it describes and
analyzes the interpretive entrepreneurship phenomenon through a
collection of case studies relating to diverse areas of public and private
international law.1 7 The case studies are based on both original research
and a cross-disciplinary literature review. They cast a wide net, ranging
from aircraft financing 8 to the meaning of "modern slavery"19 for the
purpose of supply chain due diligence. They address private sector
interpretations in trade and investment law20 as well as the Outer Space
Treaty's application to commercial mining.21
The case studies show how, why, and by whom interpretive
entrepreneurship unfolds.22 The methods of interpretation are both formal
and informal; they are sometimes facilitated by the apparatus of the state,
and sometimes take place in purely private fora. Targets of persuasive
campaigns, the "audiences" for these private sector interpretations, can be
state parties to a treaty, domestic courts or international tribunals,
subnational regulators, shareholders, or the public. The case studies show
15 See Jesse H. Choper, Introduction to The Political Question Doctrine and The Supreme
Court of the United States 1, 1-2 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007)
(outlining debates about the political question doctrine); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12,
at 1252-56 (examining consequences of presidential control over international lawmaking and
interpretation).
16 The approach places this Article within the "empirical turn" in international legal
scholarship, which focuses on "midrange theorizing," or building theory from the study of
facts. Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal
Scholarship, 106 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 1 (2012).
' See infra Sections II.A & B.
18 See infra Subsection II.A.I.
19 See infra Subsection II.A.4.
20 See infra Subsection II.A.3 & Section II.B.
21 See infra Subsection II.A.2.
22 For all the points in this paragraph, see the discussion in Section II.C.
436 [Vol. 107:431
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that private actors can engage in interpretive entrepreneurship for a
variety of purposes, including to entrench commerce-friendly
interpretations, forestall regulation, secure reputational benefits, or
demonstrate compliance.
The Article's second contribution is to show how the interpretive
entrepreneurship phenomenon contributes to and re-frames existing
debates on international legal interpretation. Many debates focus on
interpretive rules found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
("VCLT" or Vienna Convention),23 and on the best methods to apply
those rules.24 A "retrievalist" view suggests that applying the rules
correctly will produce a correct interpretation.25 But the Vienna
Convention rules themselves require interpretation,26 and critical theorists
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-33, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, The Existential Function of
Interpretation in International Law, in Interpretation in International Law, supra note 12, at
78, 80 ("Conventional wisdom focuses almost entirely on .. . a single interpretive method-
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT."); Peat & Windsor, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that the "state
of play" when it comes to interpretation in international legal scholarship and practice "is
characterized by a myopic focus on the rules of treaty interpretation in Articles 31-33 of the
VCLT").
24 As any international lawyer can explain, the Vienna Convention rules instruct that treaties
should be "interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 23, at art. 31, 1 1. The vast majority of legal
scholarship on international legal interpretation addresses the proper use of these rules. See
discussion infra Subsection l.B.1. Their apparent simplicity masks myriad questions, which
have spawned a variety of interpretive approaches, including textualism, purposivism, and a
teleological approach, among others. See Hollis, supra note 23, at 81 (noting that "proponents
of different interpretive methods claim that the VCLT accommodates, or privileges, their
method").
25 Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical
Reason 241-64 (2009) ("Interpretation is therefore often thought to be retrieval, a process of
retrieving and elucidating the meaning the original has.").
26 See Hollis, supra note 23, at 84 (noting that the VCLT rules themselves require
interpretation); see also John Tobin, Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human
Rights Treaty Interpretation, 23 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1, 3 (2010) ("[The Vienna Convention] is
ultimately unable to resolve the question of how to choose a meaning ... from among the
inevitable range of potential meanings.").
Indeed, twentieth century American legal realists observed that all law might be
indeterminate. See, e.g., Karl Lewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1237 (1931) (arguing that one of the hallmarks of realism is
"distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily operative
factor in producing court decisions"); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 843 (1935) ("A truly realistic theory of judicial
decisions must conceive every decision as ... a product of social determinants and an index
of social consequences."); see also H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 204 (2d ed. 1994)
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 107:431
reject the formalist project as blinkered, observing that legal interpretation
is infused with ideology and reflects and embeds power.2 7 A third,
"constructivist," approach proposes that interpretation is necessarily a
creative process, as interpreters use various tools to try to persuade others
within interpretive communities.28 Interpretation is a contest, a game, or
a staging ground for bargaining.29 This Article re-focuses these debates,
showing how, for each of the dominant theoretical approaches to
international legal interpretation, the process of interpretation has real
stakes. It also gives credence to critical and constructivist understandings
that the identity of the interpreter matters to the interpretation.
Third, the Article frames these interpretive processes as a form of post
hoc lawmaking,30 which develop the meaning of laws over time. The
phenomenon is worth studying alongside activities like lobbying and
agency capture that exert pressure on lawmaking ex ante.3' The project
("[T]he open texture of law leaves a vast field for creative activity which some call
legislative.").
27 See, e.g., Phillip Allott, Interpretation-An Exact Art, in Interpretation in International
Law, supra note 12, at 373, 375 (noting that "[t]o anyone who knows anything
about ... epistemology" the idea that treaties have meaning "may seem comical in its
naivety"); Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal
Argument 8 (2006) ("Meaning is not .. . present in the expression itself."); Ian Johnstone,
Introduction, 102 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 411, 411 (2008) (noting debates over whether
interpreters are "making law, based on values and policy choices"); see also Note, 'Round and
'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 1669, 1678 (1982) (noting that critical scholars recognize the "historical contingency of
law" and doctrinal first principles "represent mere choices of one set of values over another");
discussion infra Subsection I.B.2 (developing these points).
28 Crawford, supra note 14, at v ("[I]nternational lawyers think that their interpretations are
right, and they play the game [of interpretation] by trying to convince others of this."). The
term "constructivist" is appropriate here because the term "epistemic community" arose out
of constructivist international relations theory. Michael Waibel, Interpretive Communities in
International Law, in Interpretation in International Law, supra note 12, at 147, 149.
29 See Waibel, supra note 28, at 148 (calling interpretation a "contest"); Crawford, supra
note 14, at v (calling interpretation a "game"); Andrea Bianchi, The Game of Interpretation in
International Law: The Players, the Cards, and Why the Game is Worth the Candle, in
Interpretation in International Law, supra note 12, at 34, 34 (calling interpretation a "game");
Yanbai Andrea Wang, The Dynamism of Treaties, 78 Md. L. Rev. 828, 837 (2019) (calling
treaties "departure points for further bargaining").
30 See infra Part III.
31 See Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 167,
170-71 (1999) (conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent of small interest groups); Rachel
Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 501, 539
(2004) (noting that governments make international agreements in response to domestic
needs); Melissa J. Durkee, International Lobbying Law, 127 Yale L.J. 1742, 1747 (2018)
(describing the "quotidian reality of international lobbying"). The fact that international
438
2021 ] Interpretive Entrepreneurs 439
therefore contributes to literatures that investigate how multinational
entities wield their power to shape international law.32 It is also in
conversation with a literature that explores the role of "regulatory
intermediaries" in developing international law,33 and a literature that
conceives of international law as the product of "norm cascades"
produced in part by norm entrepreneurs.34 Understanding interpretive
entrepreneurship as one way private actors influence the law clarifies the
practice of international legal interpretation, helps evaluate its effects on
the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law, and develops a
foundation for potential reforms.
The practical context is important. Despite existential global threats
like climate change, the risk of pandemic, and regional conflicts, the early
lawmakers face pressures from domestic constituencies has long been a matter of interest
within international relations. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A
Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 Int'l Org. 513, 518 (1997) (arguing that in liberal
international relations theory, domestic constituencies construct state interests); Robert D.
Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int'l Org.
427, 433-34 (1988) (theorizing that the negotiating behavior of national leaders reflects the
dual and simultaneous pressures of international and domestic political games).
32 These conversations are playing out in multiple disciplines. See, e.g., John Braithwaite &
Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation 5-7, 27-33 (2000) (sociology); Walter Mattli &
Ngaire Woods, Introduction to The Politics of Global Regulation, at ix, x-xii (Walter Mattli
& Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (political science); A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony
Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs, in Private Authority and International
Affairs 3, 4 (A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter eds., 1999) (international
relations); Tim Buthe & Walter Mattli, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of
Regulation in the World Economy 5 (2011) (law); Joshua Barkan, Corporate Sovereignty:
Law and Government Under Capitalism 8-14 (2013) (political geography).
3 Kenneth W. Abbott, David Levi-Faur & Duncan Snidal, Theorizing Regulatory
Intermediaries: The RIT Model, 670 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 14 (2017). This
literature seeks to understand how "state actors, private organizations, and civil society actors
mediate the meaning of legal rules in regulatory governance arrangements that they participate
in." Shauhin Talesh, Rule-Intermediaries in Action: How State and Business Stakeholders
Influence the Meaning of Consumer Rights in Regulatory Governance Arrangements, 37 Law
& Pol'y 1, 2 (2015).
3 Martha Finnemore & Katheryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 Int'l Org. 887, 893 (1998) (introducing the idea that norms "cascade" through an
international system after a sufficient number of states adopt the norm; advocacy groups can
help initiate this process by serving as "norm entrepreneurs"). The "norm cascade" literature
has focused on advocacy groups, id., rather than private sector norm entrepreneurs, and has
focused on the role of non-governmental organizations in the emergence of a norm rather than
the interpretation of that norm once a treaty has been adopted. See Heidi Nichols Hadad, After
the Norm Cascade: NGO Mission Expansion and the Coalition for the International Criminal
Court, 19 Glob. Governance 187, 187 (2013) (noting the assumption that "NGOs exercise
their greatest impact on norm change during the early stages of norm emergence").
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twenty-first century is not an era of multilateral lawmaking. Rather, the
tools at hand are principally the laws on the books. As the Article shows,
because interpretation can develop those laws over time,35 they attract
contests for meaning by those who would develop or erode them.
Interpretive entrepreneurship can drive legal change.
Part I develops the argument that a process-based account of
international legal interpretation has both theoretical and practical
salience. Part II describes the interpretive entrepreneurship henomenon
through a series of case studies and organizes and analyzes this activity.
Part III characterizes interpretive entrepreneurship as post hoc lawmaking
and identifies its implications.
I. DOES IT MATTER WHO INTERPRETS THE LAW?
Interpreting a legal text requires creativity, rigor, and, at times,
specialized knowledge. For this reason, the identity of the interpreter can
affect interpretive outcomes. The political and judicial branches in the
United States recognize this fact, as they have long debated which is better
suited to interpret particular areas of law.36 But there is no parallel
conversation on the international stage. Instead, scholars have focused
almost exclusively on interpretive doctrines. Even the rare accounts that
focus on the process of interpretation do so from the theoretical confines
of jurisprudential, literary, or critical theory, or focus on the courts. As
this Part shows, while the process of international legal interpretation is
important for both practical and theoretical reasons, it remains largely a
black box.
A. Interpretation Matters in Practice
Does it matter who interprets a statute, constitutional provision, or
treaty? In the United States, the popular answer is clearly yes. Political
wrangling over the constitution of the federal judiciary is revealing.37 The
* Rahim Moloo, Changing Times, Changing Obligations? The Interpretation of Treaties
Over Time, 106 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 261, 261, 264 (2012) [hereinafter Moloo, Changing
Times?] (noting that while treaties are hard to amend, treaty interpretation can adapt treaties
to changing circumstances).
36 See infra Section I.A. (reviewing this debate).
3 See Joseph J. Ellis, The Supreme Court Was Never Meant to Be Political, Wall St. J.
(Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-pretending-the-supreme-court-is-above-
politics-1536852330 [https://perma.cc/TU2G-95XW] (examining the importance of
presidential nominations of Justices to the Supreme Court by pointing to the growth of
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popular assumption is that disputes over controversial issues will be
resolved according to the political predilections of the judges.38 Indeed,
American legal realism has suggested that decision making is not a
process fully determined by texts and constrained by precedents, but,
rather, infused with politics and ideology.39
The three branches of the U.S. government certainly care which among
them interprets. In the foreign affairs context, Presidents have
increasingly asserted the authority to both make obligations for the United
States and interpret those obligations and commitments.40 At the same
time, courts have sometimes pushed back, "whittling away the deference
[they] traditionally granted to political branches in foreign relations
by ... tightening [their] control over treaty interpretation."41 The
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
indeed gives U.S. courts "final authority to interpret an international
agreement," but it instructs that courts should "give great weight to an
interpretation made by the Executive Branch."42 This deference "reflects
a common wisdom" that Presidents "have special knowledge" about the
meaning of treaty texts and know "what interpretations will best forward
U.S. interests in the world."43 This dialogue between the executive and
seemingly political 5-4 decisions since 1954); see also Carl Hulse, Political Polarization Takes
Hold of the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (July 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/us/politics/political-polarization-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/P6SK-KNGR] (observing perceptions that the Supreme Court is becoming
more politically polarized and less neutral).
38 E.g., Most Americans Trust the Supreme Court, but Think It Is 'Too Mixed Up in
Politics,' Associated Press (Oct. 16, 2019), https://apnews.com/PR%20Newswire/cal62cc
03b3261ff608ab7d8cfc31a25 [https://perma.cc/7U2X-VURA] (reporting on surveys that
reflect that a growing number of the American public views the Supreme Court as partisan).
39 Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 470 (1988) (book
review) ("Social context, the facts of the case, judges' ideologies, and professional consensus
critically influence individual judgments and patterns of decisions over time. The realists felt
that study of such factors could improve predictability of decisions."); Lewellyn, supra note
26, at 1237 (arguing that one of the hallmarks of realism is "distrust . .. that traditional
prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions");
Cohen, supra note 26, at 843 ("A truly realistic theory of judicial decisions must conceive
every decision as .. . a product of social determinants and an index of social consequences.").
40 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1203 (arguing that "Presidents have come to
dominate the making, interpretation, and termination of international law for the United
States").
4' Harlan Grant Cohen, The Death of Deference and the Domestication of Treaty Law, 2015
BYU L. Rev. 1467, 1469 (2015) [hereinafter Cohen, Death of Deference].
42 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 326 (Am. L. Inst.
1986).
43 Cohen, Death of Deference, supra note 41, at 1467.
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the courts suggests that the identity of the interpreter of the law matters to
the interpretation.
Indeed, interpretation is not a deterministic task. It is not ministerial,
like processing paperwork at the department of motor vehicles. Rather, it
involves a creative process of applying a suite of interpretive tools and
philosophies to a particular text. The inherent complexity and creativity
of this task has provoked a set of longstanding debates in the United
States. Beyond institutional competence to interpret, debates surround
interpretive theory44 and canons of construction.45 When, for example, is
a question too "political" for judicial resolution?46 Is it reasonable to
assume that Congress did not intend its legislation to contradict
international law?
Since Marbury v. Madison, debates have not generally turned on
whether judicial interpretation is authoritative.47 With a system of general
jurisdiction and precedent, most questions of interpretation in U.S. law
are ultimately susceptible to final resolution.
On the international plane, by contrast, the process of interpretation is
both more complex and less understood. It is more complex because it is
decentralized. Most interpretive questions are not submitted for
adjudication.48 There is no official system of precedent to carry judicial
interpretations forward as law.49 The authoritative interpreters of law are
44 See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, The Theories of Statutory Construction and Legislative Process
in American Jurisprudence, in Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking 173, 174
(Michal Araszkiewicz & Krzysztof Pleszka eds., 2015) (introducing the competing theories
of statutory interpretation as applied in American jurisprudence). Debates implicate theories
like originalism, textualism, and intentionalism, and include familiar questions about whether
interpretation should privilege the specific intent of the drafters or render the text adaptable to
new circumstances. See id. at 181-94.
45 See id. at 180 (explaining that judges use canons of construction to discern legislative
meaning; some of these have at times been highly controversial, and their use has changed
over time).
46 See Choper, supra note 15, at 1-2 (describing debates, perspectives, and issues).
47 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Bernard W. Bell,
Marbury v. Madison and the Madisonian Vision, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 197, 197 (2003)
("[T]hat the Court in at least some instances has the power to enforce the Constitution by
invalidating the actions of all government officials, even Congress and the [P]resident acting
through the legislative process-is no longer seriously contested.").
48 See Posner, supra note 12, at 1-2 (examining potential theories for why the ICJ's light
caseload has declined over the long term relative to the number of states).
49 See Cohen, Theorizing Precedent, supra note 12, at 269 ("International law
today ... generally denies international precedents doctrinal force.... [J]udicial decisions
construing international law are not in and of themselves law-decisions are not binding on
future parties in future cases, even before the same tribunal.").
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the nations that have entered into a treaty, either individually (when a
provision is "self-judging") or collectively. 50 Nations sometimes delegate
their interpretive authority to courts or international organizations."
Despite the complexity and decentralization of this process,
interpretive questions animate very important debates in international
law. Can international trade law accommodate environmental concerns,
and, if so, to what extent? This depends on the proper interpretation of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").5 2 Can nations turn
away migrants at national borders for fleeing violence or economic
conditions? This depends on how expansively one reads the Refugee
Convention.5 3 Whether nations may place warning labels on cigarette
packages depends on how one reads relevant bilateral investment
treaties.54 Whether the commercial space industry can legally mine
asteroids or the moon depends, in turn, on how one interprets the Outer
Space Treaty."
Because interpretation decides important questions in international
law, it is important to understand how these interpretive debates are
resolved. What is the international interpretive process? Who participates
in it? Which interpreters are most competent to address particular
questions in what contexts? To the extent the scholarship addresses these
5 Ulrich Fastenrath, Relative Normativity in International Law, 4 Eur. J. Int'l L. 305, 335
(1993).
5 See Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71
Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 1, 14 (2008) ("[T]he individual state surrenders some autonomy to
international bodies ... by authorizing them to participate in decision-making processes and
to take actions that affect the state. ... A regulatory delegation grants authority to create
administrative rules to implement, fill gaps in, or interpret preexisting international
obligations.").
52 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 3, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Nov. 21, 2001) (deciding
whether the United States could prohibit the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products
under Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994).
5 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) (defining "refugee"); see also M. Akram Faizer, America
First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933, 953-
54 (2017) ("Refugees are entitled to claim protection under the Refugee Convention while
economic migrants are excludable and deportable .... ").
5 See David N. Cinotti, How Informed is Sovereign Consent to Investor-State Arbitration?,
30 Md. J. Int'l L. 105, 113 (2015) (discussing Philip Morris's arbitrations against Uruguay for
requiring graphic images on the warning labels on cigarette cartons).
5 Melissa J. Durkee, Interstitial Space Law, 97 Wash. U. L. Rev. 423, 452 (2019) (noting
that the answer to whether companies may legally make commercial use of outer space
resources depends on interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty).
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questions, attention focuses on international tribunals,56 even though
many interpretive questions never reach these tribunals, and the tribunals
produce interpretations that are not authoritative beyond the matter at
hand.57
B. Interpretation Matters in Theory
The process of interpretation and the identity of the interpreters should
matter to theories of international legal interpretation as well. There are,
I propose, three main theoretical approaches: the dominant formalist or
"retrievalist" approach, and critical and constructivist approaches that
react to that formalism. Although interpretive process questions are
underappreciated, each of these approaches should attend to them.
Formalists should want to know if that process responsibly delivers the
meaning of the text. Critics should care whose ideology and power
determines international legal meaning. Constructivists should care who
populates the interpretive communities that define the meaning of a text
and whether interpretation consolidates or fragments meaning across
communities. All these questions implicate the legitimacy and
effectiveness of international law.
1. Retrievalism: Interpretation Can Confirm or Distort Meaning
The vast majority of the scholarship that considers interpretation in
international law focuses its attention on a set of interpretive rules.58 This
56 Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, Reviewing Two Decades of IL/IR Scholarship:
What We've Learned, What's Next, in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law
and International Relations 626, 637-38 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013)
("[M]ost legal interpretation takes place outside of courts.... But this activity has largely
fallen outside the purview of IL/IR scholarship.... The methodological challenges of
studying dispute settlement outside the judicial arena are substantial .... "). But see Ingo
Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative
Twists (2012) (exploring how actors who hold semantic authority can shift the meanings of
international legal texts through discourse about them).
57 See Cohen, Theorizing Precedent, supra note 12, at 269 (international judicial decisions
lack precedential value); Posner, supra note 12, at 1 (international courts do not decide many
cases).
" See, e.g., Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 233 (2d ed. 2007) ("[W]hatever
the mechanism by which a dispute about the interpretation or application of a treaty is
determined, the body will be guided by the principles and rules in Articles 31 and 32 [of the
Vienna Convention]."); Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 9 (2d ed. 2015) ("This
book is not about theory. It is about the practical use of the Vienna rules."); The Oxford Guide
to Treaties 475-550 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012) (focusing three chapters on interpretation on
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"voluminous" body of scholarship is largely "descriptive and practical,"59
rather than theoretically oriented. That is, this work is not particularly
concerned with offering an account of what interpretation is and how it
functions in the international system. Implicitly, however, it exhibits what
Joseph Raz would call the "retrieval" view of interpretation60: The rules
have "an established meaning which the interpreter must discover 'as in
a hunt for buried treasure."'61 Some, but not all, of this literature could be
characterized as formalist. 62 Whatever the label, at the heart of the project
is the view that interpretation matters because it will either correctly or
incorrectly deliver the meaning of a text.
The interpretive rules appear in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna Convention"). 63 They
instruct interpreters to interpret "in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose."64 They give some additional
instructions as well, defining the treaty's "context," 65 allowing
the Vienna Convention rules and special circumstances where it is necessary to diverge from
them); Christian J. Tams, Antonios Tzanakopoulous & Andreas Zimmermann, Research
Handbook on the Law of Treaties, at xi-xii (Christian J. Tams, Antonios Tzanakopoulous &
Andreas Zimmermann eds., 2014).
59 Peat & Windsor, supra note 14, at 6-7.
60 Raz, supra note 25, at 264.
61 Peat & Windsor, supra note 14, at 9 (quoting Raz, supra note 25, at 241-64).
62 It should be noted that some who advance purposive or evolutive theories of treaty
interpretation may chafe at being placed in the "formalist" camp. These thinkers consider only
stricter textualists to be formalists and call themselves something else, perhaps
"functionalists." The point of lumping all these positions together here is not to eliminate these
important distinctions, but to show that much of the international legal scholarship on
interpretation focuses on how to apply the rules of the game, the Vienna Convention rules, as
each of these positions does. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
63 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 23, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. Even
states that have not joined the Vienna Convention, like the United States, usually consider the
treaty's rules to be legally binding through customary international law. See, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights and Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 399, 424 (2000) (noting that U.S. scholars and executive branch officials accept that
many provisions of the Vienna Convention have entered into custom). The International Court
of Justice has also treated the Vienna Convention's interpretive rules as binding through
custom. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 146, 149 n.16
(1987) (observing "the readiness of international tribunals," including the ICJ, "to accept, as
custom, the major substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties").
64 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 23, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
65 Id. (defining the context to include the preamble and annexes, among other things).
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interpreters to refer to the "preparatory work of the treaty,"66 and
permitting interpreters to consider agreements and practice that have
developed since the treaty was fmalized.67
Scholarship on the Vienna Convention rules is "voluminous."68 It
considers how much weight to give to the intention of the treaty parties;69
how to follow the "object and purpose" instruction (developing textual,
teleological, and purposive approaches, among others);70 whether treaty
meaning can evolve over time;7 1 what counts as "subsequent practice"
and how to weigh it; 72 how to handle the preparatory work; 73 and whether
to take different approaches to interpretation in different areas of
international law, such as human rights,74 criminal,75 trade,76 tax,77 and
66 Id. Note that the preparatory work of the treaty is the international version of legislative
history.
67 Id.
68 Peat & Windsor, supra note 14, at 6.
69 See, e.g., Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, The "Object and Purpose" of a Treaty: An
Enigma?, 3 Austrian Rev. Int'l & Eur. L. 311, 315 (1998); David S. Jonas & Thomas N.
Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 565, 577 (2010).
70 See Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary International Law
Modifies Treaties, 41 Yale J. Int'l L. 237, 252 (2016) (identifying these as the "three primary
schools of thought on treaty interpretation").
71 See, e.g., Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Informal
Change in International Organizations, 38 Yale J. Int'l L. 289, 294 (2013) (discussing
approaches to treaty interpretation based on the original and subsequent intent of state parties).
72 See, e.g., Georg Nolte, Introduction to Treaties and Subsequent Practice 1-2 (Georg Nolte
ed., 2013); Crootof, supra note 70, at 240; Rahim Moloo, When Actions Speak Louder Than
Words: The Relevance of Subsequent Party Conduct to Treaty Interpretation, 31 Berkeley J.
Int'l L. 39, 57 (2013) [hereinafter Moloo, Subsequent Party Conduct] (discussing the type of
subsequent conduct relevant to treaty interpretation according to the Vienna convention).
73 See, e.g., Yahli Shereshevsky & Tom Noah, Does Exposure to Preparatory Work Affect
Treaty Interpretation? An Experimental Study on International Law Students and Experts, 28
Eur. J. Int'l L. 1287, 1310 (2017) (finding that "preparatory work can play a significant role
in decision making").
74 See Julian Arato, Accounting for Difference in Treaty Interpretation Over Time, in
Interpretation in International Law, supra note 12, at 205, 205-06 (collecting evidence that
courts have taken a distinctive approach to the interpretation of human rights treaties).
" E.g., Neha Jain, Interpretive Divergence, 57 Va. J. Int'l L. 45, 47-48 (2017) (challenging
an "orthodox" position of treaty interpretation through an examination of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court).
76 E.g., Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, at lxiii
(2009) (examining interpretive methods in WTO jurisprudence).
77 E.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting Tax Treaties, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1387, 1389-91
(2016) (arguing that because of the distinctive features of tax treaties, courts are justified in
relying on extrinsic materials when interpreting them).
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commercial disputes.78
The argument of a retrievalist should be that interpretation matters to
legitimacy. A better, more legally sound interpretation is more legitimate
as binding law. Poorer interpretations can erode legal meaning.
Performing the task of interpretation accurately is important because it
safeguards the bargains treaties embody. Scholarship in this vein has
focused on ensuring that interpretation is done well by working on a
substantive level, ensuring that the interpreters have a good grasp on how
the rules work.
Another way to ensure good legal interpretations is to understand how
the process of interpretation unfolds, and whether procedural safeguards
might preserve substantive integrity. A retrievalist should therefore care
about this process and about the identities of the interpreters. Are
interpreters performing their job well? Are some interpreters better suited
to do this than others? Does the involvement of some actors in
interpretative processes harm the legitimacy of international law by
producing bad interpretations?79 Persuasive tactics and mixed motives
could hypothetically have a corrosive effect, leading to poorer
interpretations. Testing these hypotheses requires a descriptively
grounded analysis, which is substantially untilled ground.
2. Critical Approaches: Interpretation Is a Tool of Power
The problem with the retrievalist approach is that it appears to fail on
its own terms. Different interpreters can use the same rules to "discover"
different meanings. In fact, the Vienna Convention rules themselves are
underdeterminate.80 Indeed, critical approaches point out that the idea that
the Vienna Convention rules can "retrieve" stable meanings is false and
dangerous.81  The critique stems from "[c]oncerns about the
78 E.g., Joanna Jemielniak, Legal Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration 61-
64 (2014).
79 Another question formalists may care about, which lies beyond the scope of this project,
is whether real-world processes of international legal interpretation moves take place outside
of the ambit of national sovereignty or delegated authority. Are non-state interpreters
competing with sovereigns or displacing authoritative interpretations?
80 After all, as the previous discussion illustrated, questions about how properly to apply the
Vienna Convention are what fuel the voluminous scholarly debates. See supra Subsection
I.B.1.
' The critical legal studies movement has developed and amplified the critique, but it began
much earlier. See Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of
Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 48, 53 (1949) (noting that
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ineradicability of ideology and politics in international legal
interpretation .... "82 The motivation for an interpretative choice does not
flow independently from the text but instead from the politics and
ideology of the interpreter.83 What lawyers and scholars call interpretation
is actually the process of justifying a particular approach to the text with
arguments. Those arguments are "camouflaged attempts to impose the
speaker's subjective, political opinions on others."84 Interpretation,
according to Martti Koskenniemi, "creates meaning rather than discovers
it."85
Because interpretation creates meaning, in this view, it is "a
battleground" where "interpretation involves a potential exercise of
power."8 6 In Ingo Venzke's description of this approach, "actors struggle
for the law and thereby make the law. They try every trick in the book in
order to pull the law onto their side ... [and] try to influence what is
considered (il)legal." 87 Actors who succeed in this interpretive battle,
"decide[] what the law is and how the game should be played."88 For this
reason, "[a]ll law is masked power." 89
Subgroups within critical legal studies, like feminist legal theory and
the third world approach to international law ("TWAIL"), offer proposals
as to who may be winning this battle for meaning on the international
stage.
rules are "not the determining cause[s] of judicial decision, but the form in which the judge
cloaks a result arrived at by other means").
82 Peat & Windsor, supra note 14, at 12; see also, Johnstone, supra note 27, at 411 (2008)
(querying whether interpreters are "making law, based on values and policy choices").
83 Owen Fiss famously called this the "nihilist challenge" to law. See Owen M. Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739, 741 (1982) ("The nihilist would argue
that for any text .. . there are any number of possible meanings, that interpretation consists of
choosing one of those meanings, and that in this selection process the judge will inevitably
express his own values.").
84 Koskenniemi, supra note 27, at 18.
85 Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
86 Ingo Venzke, Is Interpretation in International Law a Game?, in Interpretation in
International Law, supra note 13, at 352, 353.
87 Id. at 359.
88 Id. at 353. See also id. at 352-53 (describing three common ways of understanding "what
it means to play the interpretive game").
89 Fiss, supra note 83, at 741; see also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and
Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17 Cambridge Rev. Int'l Affs. 197, 199 (2004) (finding that
international actors use legal meaning as a tool to "challenge each other by invoking legal
rules and principles on which they have projected meanings that support their preferences and
counteract those of their opponents").
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The feminist critique is that "both the structures of international
lawmaking and the content of the rules of international law privilege
men.. . "90 International rules have been developed by institutions in
which women are not represented or are under-represented.91 Law would
likely develop differently if women had equal decision-making power.92
While the feminist literature has not produced a robust conversation on
the process of treaty interpretation, it does recognize that there is room in
treaty interpretation to make normative choices.93 A feminist lens on
interpretation would likely show that interpretive choices have been
shaped by the legacy of male-dominated decision making; it would
certainly suggest hat the identity of the interpreter matters.94
Similarly, the TWAIL approach levies the critique that those in control
of meaning on the international stage are the former colonial powers and
that international law is a tool of injustice and domination. B.S. Chimni,
a prominent voice in this literature, has proposed that international law
"places meaning in the service of power": "[D]ominant social forces in
society maintain their domination ... through having their worldview
90 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 613, 614-15 (1991).
91 See id. at 621-22 ("In both states and international organizations the invisibility of women
is striking.... [W]omen have significant positions of power in very few states, and in those
where they do, their numbers are minuscule."). This results in legal regimes where "issues
traditionally of concern to men become seen as general human concerns" and "women's
concerns" are marginalized. Id. at 625.
92 See Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Law: Invitation To Study International
Rules in Their Social Context, 55 U. Toronto L.J. 891, 929-30 (2005) (summarizing this
literature).
93 For example, feminist thinkers have proposed that treaty interpretation should recognize
the omission of women in lawmaking. Since men have held privileged positions in developing
treaty texts, the interpretation of treaties should favor women, as the weaker parties. Id. at 930.
For example, "treaty rules that protect women's rights ... should be interpreted expansively,
and rules that prejudice women's legal interests should be narrowly construed." Id.
94 A recent volume on "Feminist Judgments in International Law" makes both the explicit
and implicit point that identity of the interpreter shapes the legal interpretation. Editors of the
volume claim that a feminist chamber may, among other things, "place greater emphasis on
the context of a dispute; highlight the impact of power and politics on international law
decision-making; foreground the experiences of individuals; [or] offer a different
interpretation of rules and rights .... " Feminist Judgments in International Law 14 (Loveday
Hodson & Troy Lavers eds., 2019). The authors make this point implicitly as well, as the
conceit of the book is to rewrite a number of different judicial decisions in international law
from a feminist perspective, demonstrating that the perspective of the interpreter matters. See
id. at 8 (explaining that "the aim of the project ... [is] to take the feminist re-writing
methodology and apply it to the decisions of international tribunals," thereby "telling the story
differently").
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accepted as natural by those over whom domination is
exercised .... International law ... legitimizes and translates a certain
set of dominant ideas into rules and thus places meaning in the service of
power."95 While Chimni principally addresses his critique to the
substance of international legal rules, which he says are "biased in favour
of the first world," 96 he notes that the critique also extends to the unjust
interpretation of those rules. Treaty interpretation has been used as a tool
to "upset the balance of rights and obligations agreed to by third world
States."97
In sum, the critical approaches observe that treaty interpretation is not
a neutral, dispassionate science but a value-laden one. It is the staging
ground for politically and ideologically motivated conflicts. These
conflicts can exclude some voices and empower others.98
The critical approaches should care about the process of interpretation
in order to understand who is included in and excluded from the process
of developing meaning. For those who think that interpretation reflects
the agenda of the interpreters and entrenches power, it will be relevant to
know the identities and agendas of those interpreters. Understanding the
process of interpretation is one way to excavate the levers of power.
3. Constructivism: Interpretation Can Determine Meaning
A third approach to interpretation addresses the problems the prior two
approaches identify: the indeterminacy of the interpretive rules and the
contingency of legal meaning. In light of these problems, how can treaties
(or any legal texts) function as stable law? A collection of approaches I
will label "constructivist" address this puzzle.
The constructivist approaches view interpretation as a creative process
of meaning construction that takes place within communities. Legal texts
9 B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, 8 Int'l. Cmty.
L. Rev. 3, 15 (2006).
96 Id. at 12-13.
" See id. at 13 (noting that "the WTO Appellate Body has interpreted the texts in a manner
as to upset the balance of rights and obligations agreed to by third world States"). Chimni
offers as an example the Appellate Body's interpretation of the balance between trade and
environmental concerns, an interpretation that, he claims, "was never envisaged by third world
States" and has brought detrimental consequences. Id.
98 Id. at 22 ("[B]oth feminist and third world scholarship address the question of exclusion
by international law.").
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are not "radically indeterminate,"99 because they are interpreted through
stable social practices.100 Shared understandings within communities
determine whether an interpretation succeeds.' 0 1 The idea is a transplant
from literary theory: Stanley Fish famously proposed that interpretive
communities, rather than authors or individual readers, produce a text's
meaning.'0 2 Owen Fiss transplanted this idea to law,10 3 identifying judges
as those populating its interpretive community.10 4 In the international
context, Ian Johnstone identified two separate interpretive communities:
first, legal advisors and other officials "directly responsible for the
conclusion and implementation of a particular treaty";1 05 and second, a
broader group consisting of "all experts and officials engaged in the
various professional activities associated with treaty practice." 06 These
groups are interpretive communities to the extent that they share
interpretive "practices and conventions,"07  and a successful
interpretation involves following those conventions.'08
99 Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, 12
Mich. J. Int'l L. 371, 378 (1991) [hereinafter Johnstone, Interpretive Communities].
100 See id; cf. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance
Notes on "The Banjo Serenader" and "The Lying Crowd of Jews," 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1513,
1519-20 (1999) (discussing the role of the audience in determining whether an interpretation
of a text is "authentic or faithful").
101 See Waibel, supra note 28, at 147.
102 See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive
Communities 14 (1980) (offering a literary theory argument that it is interpretive communities
who determine the meanings of texts); see also Peat & Windsor, supra note 14, at 10 n.48. The
idea is that "[t]he text is not an object entirely independent of its reader, nor is interpretation
an entirely individual and subjective activity; meaning is produced by neither the text nor the
reader but by the interpretive community in which both are situated." Johnstone, Interpretive
Communities, supra note 99, at 378.
103 Johnstone, Interpretive Communities, supra note 99, at 374 (noting Fiss's proposal that,
as in the case of literary interpretation, "legal interpretation is constrained by a set of
disciplining rules recognized as authoritative by an interpretive community").
104 See id. at 375 ("Fiss emphasizes that the interpretive community of judges has authority
to confer on particular interpretations because judges belong to the community .... "). Judges
do not claim that their interpretation is authoritative by arguing for its superior merits as an
intellectual matter but rather by "by virtue of their office[s]" as judges. Id. "[T]he interpretive
community of judges has authority to confer on particular interpretations because judges
belong to the community" that holds the societal mandate to make authoritative
interpretations. Id.
105 Id. at 385.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 378 (noting that it is these practices and conventions that constrain interpretive
discretion).
1o See id. at 380. The interpretive process is relational, as parties "generate, elaborate and
refine shared understandings and expectations." Id. at 381. That idea that interpretation is a
2021 ] 45 1
452 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 107:431
The idea of interpretive communities, filtered through late twentieth
century globalist optimism, led human rights scholars to study how actors
might best convince the relevant communities to adopt their views. For
example, John Tobin offered a rosy view of the potential for non-judicial
actors such as non-governmental organizations, academics, treaty
monitoring bodies, and special rapporteurs to join interpretive
communities involved in interpreting human rights norms.109 Tobin
observed that interpretation is, ultimately, an "an act of persuasion: an
attempt to persuade the relevant interpretive community that a particular
interpretation is the most appropriate meaning to adopt."" 0 Thus, Tobin
concluded, human rights proponents should play the game of persuasion
in the most effective way possible."' He offered instructions."2
For the constructivists, the identity of the interpreters should matter
because legal meaning is developed in the context of interpretive
communities, and so will reflect the understandings, agendas, and
normative priors of that community. A constructivist should want to know
who populates the relevant interpretive community to have an idea of the
norms within that community. Moreover, constructivists view
interpretation as a persuasive endeavour. If an interpretation becomes
authoritative because the relevant community accepts it, then how are
those levers of persuasion pushed? An interpretive community populated
by industry and trade associations and government officials may offer a
different interpretation than an interpretive community populated by
advocacy networks, legal academics, and international organizations.
Constructivists have been attentive to the latter kind of community, but
the activity of the former is underappreciated." 3 Moreover, divergent
persuasive endeavor blossomed inevitably into the idea that interpretation is a game with
players, strategies, objectives, and rules of play. A recent edited volume on interpretation by
Andrea Bianchi and coauthors explicitly adopts the metaphor of the game. Bianchi, supra note
29.
09 Tobin, supra note 26, at 9.
10 Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 49 ("The task of interpretation must therefore be seen not simply as the attribution
of meaning to a legal text but also as an attempt to persuade the relevant interpretive
community that a particular meaning from within a suite of potential meanings should be
adopted.").
12 Id. at 14-48 (offering suggestions for how non-judicial actors might persuasively
interpret human rights norms for audiences such as domestic government officials).
13 See generally id. (focusing on non-governmental organizations, academics, and
international organizations as among the non-judicial actors concerned with human rights
norms).
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interpretive communities may not always be in conversation with each
other. A constructivist will want to understand how legal meaning may
fragment and consolidate within and across interpretative communities.
4. The Special Problem of Custom
To conclude this discussion on theoretical approaches to interpretation,
it is worth spending just a moment on customary international law. While
custom is also susceptible to interpretation, this has not been an area of
much scholarly attention.1 4 Attention has focused instead on how to
identify customary international law through its elements, its legal status,
or its legitimacy or effectiveness as a source of law, among other
debates.15 Yet customary international law, just like any other kind of
law, "presents the question of interpreting [and] applying" it.116 The
interpretive questions reviewed in the prior Subsections are relevant here
too.1 17
114 See Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law, in The Nature of
Customary Law: Legal, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives 13, 13 (Amanda Perreau-
Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007) ("Much has been written on the legal status of
customary law, but considerably less attention has been devoted to the question of determining
the content of the customary law whose legal status (or not) is at issue."); Orfeas Chasapis
Tassinis, Customary International Law: Interpretation from Beginning to End, 31 Eur. J. Int'l
L. 235, 235 (2020) ("International lawyers seldom think of customary law and interpretation
under the same heading.").
115 See, e.g., Chasapis Tassinis, supra note 114, at 236 ("[T]he dominant approach has
largely reduced the analysis of customary international law to its identification through the
collection of appropriate evidence."); Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law
Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication, in Custom's Future: International Law in a
Changing World 34, 34-39 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016) (collecting debates, including
whether custom requires both elements of practice and opinio juris; how it is possible to
discern opinio juris; that there is no standard as to how much state practice is necessary; how
to weigh various evidences of custom formation; how much evidence is necessary to
determine whether custom has formed; whether custom is undemocratic; and so forth);
Monica Hakimi, Making Sense of Customary International Law, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1487,
1505 (2020) (arguing that a proposed customary international legal rule acquires force based
on "how the group of actors who participate in a given domain of global governance interact
with the position"); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 Va. J.
Int'l L. 449, 452 (2000) (contending that the use of customary international law should be
disfavored); Joel P. Trachtman, The Growing Obsolescence of Customary International Law,
in Custom's Future, supra, at 172, 172 (noting that many areas once covered by custom should
now be codified in treaties); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27
Mich. J. Int'l L. 115, 119 (2005) (weighing relative usefulness of custom and treaties).
116 Schauer, supra note 114, at 13.
I17 In practice, critical, formal, or constructive views tend to focus on the identification
rather than the interpretation of custom. Chasapis Tassinis, supra note 114, at 236. That is, the
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Interpretive questions involving custom have an additional layer of
complexity because custom is uncodified."8 Custom develops as nations
consistently follow a particular practice and demonstrate that they
consider that practice to be legally binding.1 9 Thus, interpreting a
customary norm requires both establishing the existence of the norm and
determining its meaning and application. The process is "arguably more
complex" than interpreting written forms of law like "statutes,
regulations, treaties, and even the common law."' 2 0
The difference ends there, however. Debates and theories about
interpretation of treaties or other legal texts should apply equally to the
process of interpreting customary international law.' 2 ' The questions
surround the respective roles of the creator and the interpreter of the norm:
How much freedom do authoritative interpreters actually have? Are they
retrieving norms or are they doing something more creative?22 In other
theoretical debates are often channelled into questions about whether a customary
international legal norm exists rather than debates about how to interpret an existing norm.
See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 112 Am. J.
Int'l L. 1, 7 (2018) (claiming that "CIL rules embody 'hegemonic' ideas and beliefs"); Daniel
H. Joyner, Why I Stopped Believing in Customary International Law, 9 Asian J. Int'l L. 31,
39 (2019) ("[A]ll of us-international courts, the ILC, and academics-in fact use our
corrupted methodologies for determining the presence of CIL in order to serve our own
instrumentalist ends."); Bradley, supra note 115 (collecting critiques).
8 Custom therefore offers parallels to the common law in the United States and
Commonwealth nations. See Bradley, supra note 115, at 34 (developing the theory that "[t]he
application of CIL by an international adjudicator ... is best understood in terms similar to
the judicial development of the common law"); see also Chasapis Tassinis, supra note 114, at
237 (noting that "interpretation ... can be applied not just to words and text but also to social
practices and unwritten rules").
119 Thus, one way to describe custom is as "the generalization of the practice of States," as
Judge Read did in the ICJ's Fisheries Case. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J.
Rep. 116, 191 (Dec. 18) (Read, J., dissenting); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 207 (June 27) ("[F]or
a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned 'amount to a settled
practice,' but they must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis... . [Relevant
States] must have behaved so that their conduct is 'evidence of a belief that this practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it."'); North Sea Continental
Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Order, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20) ("The States concerned
must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The
frequency, or even the habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough."); Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b) (providing that the Court "shall
apply .. . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law").
120 Schauer, supra note 114, at 13.
121 Id. at 15 (arguing that interpretive questions are "no less relevant when the question is
the interpretation ... of customary law").
122 Id. at 16.
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words, the debate between formalists, critics, and constructivists is
relevant in the context of custom and is perhaps even more significant in
light of custom's indeterminacy.123 As Frederick Schauer has argued,
customary international law also requires grappling with whether legal
interpretation should privilege the intent of its makers or "the demands of
morality and democracy and policy."124
Because customary international law should be susceptible to the same
debates about the authority and functions of the interpreter, it should also
invite questions about who participates in the process of interpretation.
C. The Value of Attention
The process of legal interpretation and the identity of the interpreters
matter for both practical and theoretical reasons, as the previous two
Sections have argued. To review: On a practical level, they matter because
interpretation develops the law, and different interpreters can produce
different interpretations. On a theoretical level, the process of
interpretation matters because it can discover or corrupt meaning,
construct meaning, or entrench power. Despite these potential
implications, international legal literatures have not yet directed sustained
attention to international legal interpretation as a practice, or to
developing process-based accounts of this practice. The project would
promise an array of meaningful payoffs. Studying interpretation in
practice can help evaluate the high-level theories of interpretation. It can
also help advise potential participants in the process about how the game
of interpretation is actually played and won, identify the functions that
interpretation serves in international affairs, and evaluate potential
reforms.
A process-based approach would help fill knowledge gaps. Literatures
that remain in the realm of academic abstraction and hypothesis25 or
123 Custom is also susceptible to the critique from American legal realism that law may not
substantially constrain decision makers; it is also susceptible to questions about whether
interpretation is a coherence-based process that develops within communities or a deductive
one that produces a single correct answer. Chimni, supra note 117, at 15-16; see also Chasapis
Tassinis, supra note 114, at 237-38 (pointing out that acknowledging that using customary
international law requires "interpretive choices at every juncture of custom's life" reveals the
challenge of plasticity, or the idea that "legal analysis may theoretically yield rules of
different ... scope while using the exact same evidence").
124 Schauer, supra note 114, at 16.
25 See, e.g., Andrea Bianchi, The International Regulation of the Use of Force: The Politics
of Interpretive Method, 22 Leiden J. Int'l L. 651, 653-54 (2009) (proposing that interpretive
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consider interpretation in the narrow context of nations, courts, and
international organizations126 leave open an array of questions: What
actors are part of the relevant interpretive communities? How do contests
for meaning take place? What levers of influence do they use and what
difference does all of this make for the determination of law? 2 7 These
questions require analysis based on study of facts on the ground. They
require the "midrange theorizing" that is the focus of the "empirical turn"
in international law, which focuses on building theory from the study of
facts.'28
A process-based account of international legal interpretation would
build on and contribute to existing literatures on the influence of non-state
actors on international lawmaking. The literature characterizes non-state
influences in a variety of ways: as lobbying, regulatory intermediation,
and norm entrepreneurship, among others.
Lobbying and corporate influence. A growing strand of international
scholarship over the past several decades casts corporate entities as
formidable allies or opponents to international public interests. Some of
this scholarship focuses on ways that business actors influence
communities can include "the handful of academics" that specialize in a particular rule's
application, "non-governmental organizations, lobbies, and pressure groups that may have an
interest in particular instances, and intellectuals and opinion-makers who influence public
opinion by publicly voicing their position on any given matter"); Johnstone, Interpretive
Communities, supra note 99, at 385 (identifying two interpretive communities for treaties:
first, officials directly responsible for treaty interpretation; and second, the broader
international legal community consisting of "all experts and officials engaged in the various
professional activities associated with treaty practice").
126 See, e.g., Gardiner, supra note 58 (focusing on international entities that hold formal or
delegated authority to interpret, such as international organizations, international courts and
tribunals, and national legal systems; omitting mention of non-state actors); Dunoff & Pollack,
supra note 56, at 637 (noting international legal scholarship's "almost exclusive emphasis on
judicial behavior and its relative neglect of legal interpretation per se").
127 Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor have proposed a similar set of questions, including:
What is the "purpose of interpretation in the international legal system"? Do "actors'
interpretations differ according to their professional identities"? Does "strategy motivate[]
interpretive choice"? Peat & Windsor, supra note 14, at 4.
128 E.g., Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 16, at I ("What matters now is the study of the
conditions under which international law is formed and has effects."). The lack of attention to
these questions on the international stage contrasts with attention to these interpretive
questions in the domestic context, as in U.S. domestic law. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt,
Statutory and Common Law Interpretation 4 (2013); Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of
Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation 1-3 (2010); Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under
Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 1 (2006). It also contrasts with
scrutiny of these questions in other disciplines. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 102, at 13-14
(literary theory).
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lawmaking, develop nonbinding norms, or participate in multi-
stakeholder governance.29 Another strand focuses on tools for corporate
accountability.3 0 Domestically, there has been scholarly attention to
lobbying and campaign contributions and complaints about the insulating
and deregulatory effect of corporate personhood.3 1 Internationally, there
has been a push for corporate accountability and the articulation of an as-
yet incomplete research agenda that would unearth levers of private
influence.'32 If business entities are setting the rules of the game in some
arenas, how does that happen? What are the international legal rules that
facilitate and structure this behavior? Understanding business roles in
legal interpretation would help describe the topography of business
influence in international law.
Norm cascades. A process-based account of international legal
interpretation would build on and contribute to a literature that
understands international law as the product of transnational legal
advocacy networks. In Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's
influential articulation, norms take hold through "norm cascades," which
are triggered in part by private actors.13 3 Those private actors are "norm
entrepreneurs."'34 The entrepreneurs define a norm and actively
129 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond
Borders 7-9 (2012) (global legal pluralism); Buthe & Mattli, supra note 32, at 1-2 (private
sector standard setting organizations); Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational
Legal Orders, in Transnational Legal Orders 3, 3 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer
eds., 2015) (transnational legal orders); Kenneth W. Abbott & David Gartner, Reimagining
Participation in International Institutions, 8 J. Int'l L. & Int'l Rel. 1, 4 (2012) (multi-
stakeholder structures); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit,
42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 501, 504-06 (2009) (cooperative public-private mechanisms and
projects).
130 See generally Kishnathi Parella, Treaty Penumbras, 38 U. Penn. J. Int'l L. 275, 303-11
(2017) (reviewing the robust literature that responds to institutionalized efforts to engage the
business sector through the Global Compact, the Ruggie Principles, and other efforts); see also
supra note 32 and accompanying text (gathering a multidisciplinary literature on global
corporate influence).
131 See generally sources cited supra notes 9-10 (lobbying and campaign contributions);
Adam Winkler, We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights 62
(2018) (personhood).
132 See Gregory C. Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42
Conn. L. Rev. 147, 150 (2009) (proposing this area of research); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing
International Law, 47 Va. L. Rev. 1573, 1595-1601 (2011) (noting a lack of information about
the degree and effect of corporate participation in international lawmaking).
133 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 34, at 893-94.
14 Id. at 893-98.
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proselytize for it, playing a key role in disseminating it, until they
persuade enough states to take it on, at which point a norm cascade is
triggered.135 In this conceptualization, norm entrepreneurs are issue
framers and agenda setters. The focus in the literature has been on
"transnational advocacy networks," made up of non-governmental
organizations and other civil society actors.'36 Much of the norm cascade
literature focuses on norm entrepreneurship prior to a treaty's
development and entry into force rather than in the post-treaty stage after
the norm has taken hold.137 Some recognize that non-governmental
organizations and other entrepreneurs also participate at later points, such
as by helping states internalize norms.'38 A process-based account of
interpretation would bolster this account by characterizing post-cascade
interpretation of existing norms as part of the process of developing and
disseminating international law. In other words, it focuses on what
happens after the treaty is broadly accepted. It would also highlight and
clarify the role of business groups, such as industry and trade associations
and platform company actors in this process of development.
Regulatory intermediation. A process-based account of international
legal interpretation would also build on and contribute to a literature that
understands international legal regulation as a process that includes norm
intermediaries.'39 This literature imagines regulation as a three-party
relationship where intermediaries "play major and varied roles in
regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating
implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets to
building communities of assurance and trust."140 Those intermediaries can
be private sector actors such as certification companies, accounting firms,
or credit agencies as well as advocacy groups or international
organizations. 141 The regulatory intermediary frame invites questions
about how these regulatory intermediaries affect legal meaning as they
13 Id.
136 Id. at 899; see also Erica Sandhu, Completing the Norm Life Cycle: The Post-Treaty
Involvement of NGOs in the Mine Ban Treaty and Chemical Weapons Convention 5-7 (Aug.
2014) (M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia), https://open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/
collections/ubctheses/24/items/1.0166964 [https://perma.cc/4K4C-4BDB].
137 See Sandhu, supra note 136, at 1.
1' Heidi Nichols Haddad, After the Norm Cascade: NGO Mission Expansion and the
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 19 Glob. Governance 187, 196 (2013).
139 See, e.g., Abbott, Levi-Faur & Snidal, supra note 33, at 14.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 15.
[Vol. 107:431458
Interpretive Entrepreneurs
serve their mediation function. Some have noted that under conditions of
ambiguity in the law, rule intermediaries can "act as rule-makers by
constructing the meaning of ambiguous legal rules."14 2 Process-based
accounts of international legal interpretation will likely bolster this
theoretical account and develop understanding of this meaning
construction process. They should help answer questions about how and
when private actors serve as intermediaries by interpreting legal norms,
and about the effect of this process on legal meaning.
Indeed, many scholars have observed that treaties can be susceptible to
evolving interpretations over time.14 1 Some have proposed that this
malleability can help treaties adapt to changing circumstances.144 It can
also sacrifice the legitimacy or effectiveness of international law. For
example, Andrea Wang has suggested that because treaty meanings can
change at the implementation stage, treaties function as "departure points
for further bargaining."145 This understanding raises questions about who
may be empowered by treaty implementation and interpretive processes:
will these powers "[undermine] the initial consent of state parties" or give
"a greater voice to disempowered actors," or both?1 46 Understanding the
process of interpretation will help assess these risks and benefits, and
erect guardrails to avoid potential harms.
It is a particularly important time to address questions about how
international law functions in practice. The twenty-first century is a time
of global instability, populist retrenchment, and retreats from
multilateralism. We are not making new multilateral treaties to govern
important global problems, and the treaties that do exist face skepticism,
defiance, and withdrawals.147 Major geopolitical rifts divide former allies
and make possibilities for new international agreements remote.14 8 At the
same time, borderless problems need international solutions. One of the
142 Talesh, supra note 33, at 4 (2015).
143 Crootof, supra note 70, at 252 (identifying as "[a]daptive interpretations" those that are
"not immediately suggested by the treaty, but which attempt to reconcile outdated text with
actual (or sometimes desired) state action").
144 Moloo, Changing Times?, supra note 35, at 261 (noting that treaties are hard to amend
and suggesting "we look to treaty interpretation tools to adapt treaties to evolving
circumstances").
141 Wang, supra note 29, at 837.
146 Id.
147 See Karen J. Alter, The Future of International Law, in A New Global Agenda: Priorities,
Practices, and Pathways of the International Community, at 25, 30-31 (Diana Ayton-Shenker




promises and perils of a time like this is that actors look to existing tools,
like laws that already exist, to accomplish important agendas.
II. INTERPRETIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
At the heart of this Article is a descriptive claim with two components:
First, there is a process of interpretation that takes place after a treaty
enters into force or after a customary law develops that is directed at
influencing the meaning of these laws. Second, this process of
interpretation includes an array of participants including private business
actors and groups. What this adds up to is an underappreciated, sometimes
underground, story about business influence. Scholarship has observed
that businesses lobby governments49 and international institutions, 50 and
contribute to treatymaking,'5' but the story of business influence in
interpretation remains obscure in legal scholarship.
As the case studies in this Part show, business influence over legal
meaning continues after the treaty is adopted or ratified or the customary
law crystallizes. This Part defends this descriptive claim, then offers
conceptual tools to analyze it by organizing and taxonomizing its features.
These descriptive and analytical contributions lay the groundwork for the
final Part, which identifies implications.
A. Interpretation Beyond the Courts
The case studies draw on original research as well as a cross-
disciplinary literature review. They cover a wide ambit, ranging from
rules on the financing of aircrafts to the meaning of "modern slavery" for
the purposes of supply chain due diligence. They cover examples of
private sector interpretations in trade and investment, as well as the Outer
Space Treaty's application to commercial mining. The reader should be
alert at the outset to the following features of each story: Which actors are
involved in the process of interpretation? For what reasons do they engage
'19 See generally Eskridge, supra note 9, at 5 (developing a history of U.S. federal lobbying
regulation through 1954); Susman & Luneburg, supra note 9, at 23 (offering a history of U.S.
lobbying law since 1955).
'50 See generally Durkee, supra note 31, at 1747 (describing the "quotidian reality of
international lobbying").
"I See generally Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of Treaties, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 264 (2016)




in interpretive processes? To what audiences are they directing their
effort, and how does the law require, facilitate, or restrain this process?
1. Aircraft Financing
The first example is striking because business actors use a
multipronged strategy to ensure that a treaty receives consistent
interpretations worldwide. This effort is transnational, organized, and
creative, involving multiple contexts and audiences. The effort relates to
the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (the
"Cape Town Convention").15 2
The Cape Town Convention is of particular interest o private actors:
The treaty relates to financing of equipment that can move across national
borders, such as aircraft, spacecraft, and railway cars, in order to expand
access beyond niche financiers and reduce the cost of capital.153 The
problem it was meant to solve is that with a complex patchwork of
financing laws around the world, mobile equipment was regulated by
different rules every time it crossed a border.54 A potential financer had
to be ready to master these diverse laws, sue for damages in jurisdictions
around the world, and absorb the risk of this uncertain legal landscape.1 55
The treaty was a standardization project aimed to fix this and democratize
financing.1 56 Its intentions were to ensure consistent priority rules, to
facilitate enforcement of contracts,1 57 and to clarify who has a claim to
which equipment.' 58 Understandably, the treaty is of great interest to
participants in these market transactions, such as sale-seeking
152 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 2307
U.N.T.S. 285.
"5 See Roy Goode, From Acorn to Oak Tree: The Development of the Cape Town
Convention and Protocols, 17 Unif. L. Rev. 599, 599-601 (2012) (providing aims of Cape
Town Convention).
" See Mark J. Sundahl, The "Cape Town Approach": A New Method of Making
International Law, 44 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 339, 345 (2006) (offering background on the
default rules in security interests law).
1 Id. at 345-46.
156 See Sandeep Gopalan, Comment, Harmonization of Commercial Law: Lessons from the
Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 9 Law & Bus. Rev.
Ams. 255 (2003) (discussing the role of the Cape Town Convention in harmonizing regulatory
law for the aviation industry).
157 See Roy Goode, The Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment: A Driving Force for International Asset-Based Financing, 7 Unif. L. Rev. 3, 7-9
(2002) (describing the priority rules and international registry).
158 See id. at 7.
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manufacturers of aircraft-like Boeing and Airbus-and the lenders and
potential lenders seeking to finance these sales.159
In fact, market participants have such a keen interest in the treaty that
they were significantly involved in developing it, as I have previously
described.'60 Significantly, Boeing and Airbus formed an industry group,
the Aviation Working Group, which they tasked with helping to develop
the treaty and then campaigning around the world to encourage states to
join it.16 ' The Group vigorously pursued these tasks and had a significant
role in producing a very successful treaty. It has been ratified by 82 states
as of this writing,162 and proponents describe it as enormously significant
in content.1 63
The interpretive story that is the concern of this paper picks up where
the treaty-making campaign leaves off. Remarkably, the Cape Town
Convention's entry into force in 2006 did not end the industry's concern
over the treaty or its careful attempts to develop and cultivate it. Rather,
the Aviation Working Group is the key player in continuing efforts to
implement and interpret it. While the Group was founded by Boeing and
Airbus, it now boasts a broad array of "members," including banks,
insurers, aircraft manufacturers, and lessors.'64 The Group's website
defines itself as a "not-for-profit legal entity comprised of major aviation
manufacturers, leasing companies and financial institutions" which aims
to help develop "policies, laws and regulations" about international
aviation financing.'65 The Group's 40 members range from household
names like Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and the
Mitsubishi Corporation, to a whole gamut of regional aircraft lessors like
159 See Durkee, Business of Treaties, supra note 151, at 294 (describing how business actors
were involved in drafting language and structure of the treaty as well as a ratification
campaign); Goode, supra note 153, at 606 (noting that a business working group mounted a
substantial campaign that proved indispensable to the development of the Cape Town
Convention).
160 See Durkee, Business of Treaties, supra note 151, at 294; Goode, supra note 153, at 606.
161 See Durkee, Business of Treaties, supra note 151, at 295-96.
162 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town, 2001) - Status,
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT),
https://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown [https://perma.cc/PL5L-UGDJ] (last visited
Feb. 20, 2021).
163 See Gopalan, supra note 156, at 255.
164 Inside AWG: Members, Aviation Working Group, http://www.awg.aero/inside-
awg/members/ [https://perma.cc/3J5X-LWM8] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
165 Inside AWG: Who We Are, Aviation Working Group, http://www.awg.aero/inside-
awg/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/ZU8T-4B7G] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
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the Dubai Aerospace Enterprise, the Wings Capital Partners, and more
obscure entities.'66
The Aviation Working Group pursues four current projects to facilitate
the success of the Cape Town Convention, including "ratification and
implementation of," "compliance with," "economics of," and
"international registry under" the Convention.'67 Through the first two
modes, the Group engages in a process of interpreting international law
for international law's producers and consumers: nation states.
For its implementation project, the Aviation Working Group "consults
with governments ... including on the declarations to be made and the
relationship between the Cape Town Convention and national law."1 68
The Group's central concern is to ensure that the treaty is implemented in
each national jurisdiction in such a way as to prevail over conflicting
national law.1 69 It also touts the array of voluntary declarations which the
Group recommends that countries adopt.170 To facilitate these goals, the
Group has prepared model implementation language, together with
various commentaries. In a hefty document it titles "Self-Instructional
Materials," the Group explains that although the treaty is "an undisputed
success," "[m]uch work remains to be done in . .. ensur[ing] that the
Convention and Protocols are implemented correctly as a matter
of ... domestic law."17 1
To ensure this "correct" implementation, the Self-Instructional
Materials offer a detailed explanation of the content, aims, and proper
interpretation of the treaty. The materials explain, for example, that "the
Convention was designed to override national law as to its applicability,
but not necessarily as to all of its effects."172 The materials do not cite any
source for this assertion.173 The materials also offer unsubstantiated
166 Inside AWG: Members, Aviation Working Group, http://www.awg.aero/inside-
awg/members/ [https://perma.cc/3J5X-LWM8] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
167 Our Projects: Cape Town Convention, Aviation Working Group, http://www.awg.aero/
project/cape-town-convention/ [https://perma.cc/FC3F-AL6W] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
168 Id.
169 See id.
170 See, e.g., id. (encouraging states to ensure that any declaration under the Convention
restricts preferred non-consensual liens and rights to those that are customary).
17' Aviation Working Group, Self-Instructional Materials 15 (1st ed. 2014),
http://awg.aero/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Self%20nstructional%20Materials.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DTW2-235D] (emphasis added).
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interpretive guidance for implementation of the treaty, such as, "[a]ny
inconsistency is to be resolved in favor of the Protocol,"174 and it is "not
sufficient to create an interest under the Convention that ... can be
identified as falling within the scope of the security agreement. It is
necessary that the object be specifically identified in the agreement
itself." 17 5
The Group boasts that it has formed "relationships" with governmental
actors to press this case:
The Aviation Working Group (AWG) ... has established relations with
a wide range of governments, intergovernmental bodies and industry
groups to educate governments and key industry stakeholders as to the
purpose, framework and terms of the Convention and Aircraft Protocol
and to promote the benefits that may be derived from its
implementation.176
The Group has convened a "legal advisory panel" to help it guide
governments on the correct implementation of the treaty, which includes
attorneys from major law firms in the United States and around the
world.177 Law firms also assist in translating materials to Arabic, Chinese,
French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Turkish.178 In addition to
preparing instructional materials and working with governments directly
through these "relations," the Aviation Working Group has also
"work[ed] closely with" the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law ("UNIDROIT") to convene a seminar to guide EU member
states about how to implement the treaty.1 79
The second Aviation Working Group project that serves to interpret
international law for states is its compliance project. The Group uses a
multipronged strategy. One of its means of encouraging compliance is to
monitor it, specifically through a formulaic compliance index, which will
score each country's "actual and anticipated compliance with the terms
and intent of the treaty" based on criteria determined by the Group
174 Id. at 19.
175 Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
176 Id. at 15.
177 Id. at Foreword.
178 Id. at Foreword.
179 Id. at 15.
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itself.180 To do this, the Group evaluates whether the treaty is
implemented, and whether it is implemented in such a way as to give the
treaty priority over municipal law, and, significantly, whether it "is being
interpreted and applied in accordance with its terms and intent."81 The
Group does not offer information about how it will assess the "terms and
intent" of the treaty for the purposes of scoring.'8 2 It does disclose that it
is "work[ing] with over 200 law firms worldwide ... to obtain all
compliance-related data and experience."83
The Aviation Working Group also has other elements in its
multipronged strategy aimed at compliance. These include writing amicus
briefs to intervene in domestic court cases. The Group intervenes on
behalf of members and for the purposes of "seeking compliance with the
requirements of the treaty" as it defines those.184 The Group advertises
that it has submitted briefs in actions in the United States, Brazil, India,
Nigeria, Russia, and Turkey.185 Finally, the Group works on "prevention
of non-compliance" by preparing "materials, educational outreach and
events," which "focus on the treaty in practice."'86
2. Outer Space
A phrase in the Outer Space Treaty has provoked an entrenched and
enduring interpretive debate, which is existential for the emerging space
industry.187 The treaty provides that "[o]uter space, including the moon
180 Cape Town Convention Compliance Index, Aviation Working Group,
http://www.awg.aero/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CTC-Compliance-Index-Website-
updated-October-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/36FY-CLA3] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
181 Id. (noting that the index is expected to come online in early 2020).
182 The Group has released a methodology summary, but this does not offer information as
to how the Group defines the terms and intent of the treaty for the purposes of its assessment.
See Our Projects: Cape Town Convention, Aviation Working Group, http://www.awg.






187 See, e.g., Private Sector Lunar Exploration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space of
the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 115th Cong. 75, 87 (2017) (exploring, inter alia, debate
about international law that applies to private sector lunar exploration); Reopening the
American Frontier: Reducing Regulatory Barriers and Expanding American Free Enterprise
in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space, Sci., & Competitiveness of the S. Comm.
on Com., Sci., & Transp., 115th Cong. 37 (2017) (same, with an expanded focus on various
outer space activities); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. on Its Sixtieth
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and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means."1 88 The debate concerns the word "appropriation." Does
"appropriation" include mining by commercial actors for precious
minerals?'89 Or, does it bar nations from claiming ownership of territory,
but permit use of resources?'90 The stakes are high, as the interpretation
determines the legality of private industry in space.'9'
Understandably, for a matter of such high stakes, commercial space
enterprises have been shopping around an interpretation of the treaty that
permits commercial use. This is an explicit and implicit project.
Explicitly, they lobby at national and international fora.' 92 Implicitly, they
secure billions of dollars of investment money and build businesses
Session, ¶ 227-37, U.N. Doc. A/72/20 (2017) (recording debate between nations in an
international forum).
188 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. II, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (emphasis added).
"9 See, e.g., Zachos A. Paliouras, The Non-Appropriation Principle: The Grundnorm of
International Space Law, 27 Leiden J. Int'l L. 37, 50 (2014) ("[A]s a matter of international
law, the appropriation of any part of outer space ... by private individuals is precluded by
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. Hence, any state that confers proprietary rights in outer
space would commit an internationally wrongful act .... "); Int'l L. Ass'n, Space Law, in
Report of the Fifty-Fourth Conference Held at The Hague 405, 429 (1971) ("[T]he draftsmen
of the principle of non-appropriation never intended this principle to be circumvented by
allowing private entities to appropriate areas of the Moon and other celestial bodies."); Leslie
I. Tennen, Enterprise Rights and the Legal Regime for Exploitation of Outer Space Resources,
47 U. Pac. L. Rev. 281, 288 (2016) ("State recognition of claims to extraterrestrial property
by its nationals is national appropriation 'by any other means' prohibited by Article II, no
matter what euphemistic label is employed to mask the obvious."). See generally Abigail D.
Pershing, Note, Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty's Non-Appropriation Principle:
Customary International Law from 1967 to Today, 44 Yale J. Int'l L. 149, 154-57 (2019)
(gathering sources to argue that the non-appropriation principle was originally intended to be
construed broadly and to unambiguously prohibit any appropriation of outer space resources).
190 See, e.g., Virgiliu Pop, Who Owns the Moon?: Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and
Mineral Resources Ownership 48-58 (2009) (suggesting that the treaty intended to bar only
national appropriation of outer space resources); Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime
for Exploitation of Outer Space Mineral Resources, 88 Neb. L. Rev. 794, 799 (2010) (claiming
that use of resources does not require appropriation of property, but can instead be based on a
right to engage in a particular enterprise-enterprise rights, not ownership rights). See
generally Julie Randolph, Fly Me to the Moon and Let Me Mine an Asteroid: A Primer on
Private Entities' Rights to Outer Space Resources, 59 For Defense, Dec. 2017, at 41, 43-47
(collecting sources).
191 See supra note 189.
192 See supra note 187 (legislative debates in the United States and at the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space).
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around the prospect that their preferred interpretations will prevail.1 93 The
latter kind of activity is more of a nudging or forcing behavior than a
persuasive endeavor: building a business model on a wager that a
preferred interpretation will prevail. It is the kind of legally disruptive
activity that Pollman and Barry call "regulatory entrepreneurship."19 4 The
point of spotlighting the activity in this paper is to show that private actors
use this nudging or forcing behavior as one among a suite of tools to push
entrepreneurial interpretations of existing law.
Testimony in the U.S. Congress offers one glimpse into both the
explicit interpretive efforts and the implicit interpretation-forcing activity.
For example, Bigelow Aerospace proposed that the U.S. Senate should
"update" the Outer Space Treaty to more clearly permit mining, while
asserting that such an update is consistent with a responsible
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty.'95 A treaty "update" would not
be "inconsistent with most of the language provided in the Treaty,"
Bigelow's president said, but would merely clarify the correct
interpretation: "I think this is not inconsistent. The 1967 Treaty
provides .. . that all foreign bodies should be used in the interest of the
common welfare of mankind. That doesn't exclude free enterprise by any
means."196
A director of another outer space company called Blue Origin affirmed
this commerce-friendly interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty but
recognized that some countries may not agree with it.197 He urged the U.S.
government to affirm the proposed interpretation with foreign
counterparts: "I think it's important from a government perspective that
we go out and explain what our interpretation of the treaty is and the
framework that we're establishing and lead by example."'98
193 See infra notes 199-209 and accompanying text.
194 See Pollman & Barry, supra note 2, at 385.
195 Reopening the American Frontier: Reducing Regulatory Barriers and Expanding
American Free Enterprise in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space, Sci., &
Competitiveness of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 115th Cong. 40-41 (2017).
196 Id.
197 Private Sector Lunar Exploration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space of the H.
Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 115th Cong. 76 (2017) (statement of Bretton Alexander,
Director of Business Development and Strategy, Blue Origin).
198 Id. (emphasis added). Alexander quite explicitly urged the U.S. government to shop
around his industry's favored interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty to international
counterparts:
I think it's important for the U.S. government through the State Department to be
talking internationally with its counterparts, particularly in the U.N. Committee on
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As for the implicit interpretative positions asserted through nudging or
forcing behavior, the testimony gives evidence of these as well. The CEO
of Galactic Ventures told the U.S. Senate in 2017 that his companies are
part of a growing group of companies making active plans to use space
resources:
[We] are a part of a robust and growing domestic commercial space
industry ... made up of companies with private financial backing
working on a myriad of missions ... [including] asteroid mining ....
The commercial space industry is well underway and poised to continue
its growth.'99
The president of Blue Origin also claimed that his companies were
supporting commercial plans to exploit space resources: "[w]e are
building the next generation of transportation infrastructure: reliable,
affordable, frequent rides to space for everything from .. .resource
mining to microgravity manufacturing."200 Similarly, the CEO of Moon
Express reviewed an array of plans the company has made to engage in
collection of lunar resources for a House of Representatives
subcommittee.20'
Companies have also publicized their intention to engage in
commercial resource appropriation in space beyond the U.S. Congress.
The argument, again, is that these companies are fighting the interpretive
battle in the court of public opinion, launching a business on the prospect
of legal change, and then using public pressure as one tool to accomplish
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space about what the Space Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, allows
and how we're interpreting that. It's important for us as an industry to have the certainty
that ... it's founded in the Outer Space Treaty, which basically say[s] that those
resources are available to everybody so that when we go, let's say, to the Moon and
discover water ice there, we're not saying now we own every piece of resource on the
Moon and every bit of water ice on the Moon; we're saying, you know, we are able to
utilize what we are able to extract and be able to sell that and have property rights over
that but not rights to the entire Moon.
Id. (emphasis added).
199 Reopening the American Frontier: Reducing Regulatory Barriers and Expanding
American Free Enterprise in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space, Sci., &
Competitiveness of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 115th Cong. 22 (2017) (statement
of George Whitesides, CEO, Galactic Ventures).
200 Id. at 13 (statement of Robert Meyerson, President, Blue Origin).
201 Private Sector Lunar Exploration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space of the H.
Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 115th Cong. 23-35 (2017) (statement of Bob Richards,
Founder and CEO, Moon Express, Inc.).
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that change.202 Moon Express has publicized its intention to "prospect for
materials on the Moon as candidates for economic development."203
Before its later demise, Planetary Resources intended to mine asteroids
for water, platinum, and other precious metals.204 The company was very
public about these plans205 and attracted substantial investments from
prominent investors.206 Tokyo-based company iSpace207 intends to
"locate, extract and deliver lunar ice to space agencies and private space
companies."208 iSpace has raised $95 million, secured launch space on
SpaceX rockets, and attracted commercial partnerships and major funding
partners such as Japan Airlines.209
202 See Pollman & Barry, supra note 2, at 384-85 (describing "regulatory entrepreneurship"
as advancing a business model on the prospect of legal change, and then pushing for that
change).
203 Private Sector Lunar Exploration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space of the H.
Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 115th Cong. 26 (2017) (statement of Bob Richards, Founder
and CEO, Moon Express, Inc.).
204 See Mike Wall, Asteroid Mining May Be a Reality by 2025, Space (Aug. 11, 2015),
https://www.space.com/30213-asteroid-mining-planetary-resources-2025.html
[https://perma.cc/92C2-9PPN].
205 Todd Bishop, Mining a $20 Trillion Asteroid? New Clues Emerge About Space Robot
Startup, GeekWire (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.geekwire.com/2012/mining-20-trillion-
asteroid-clues-space-robot-startup/ [https://perma.cc/EVW9-W5WN] (reporting on plans
announced by Planetary Resources Chairman Peter Diamandis in a TED talk to "go out and
grab one of these [asteroids]," which he estimated to be "worth something like $20 trillion").
206 Kenneth Chang, If No One Owns the Moon, Can Anyone Make Money Up There?, N.Y.
Times (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/26/science/moon-express-outer-
space-treaty.html [https://perma.cc/2D4Q-FHUB] (reporting that investors included a co-
founder of Google, a former chief software architect at Microsoft, and the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg).
207 Jamie Carter, A Japanese Startup is Set To Go Hunting for Ice ... on the Moon,
Techradar (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.techradar.com/news/japanese-startup-set-to-go-
hunting-for-ice-on-the-moon [https://perma.cc/5XHL-LSK2] (noting the company intends to
"kick-start a new commercial space industry" by laying groundwork for other countries to
engage in activities on the moon).
200 Id. (reporting that the company wants "to identify where water ice exists and map that
out so that we can eventually learn how to use it as a resource ... to create basic rocket fuel
for spacecraft").
209 Id. Another example is a UK startup called the Asteroid Mining Corporation, which seeks
"to extract resources from asteroids to boost the Earth's economy and kick start the Space
Based Economy." Our Values, Asteroid Mining Corp., https://asteroidminingcorporation.
co.uk/our-vision [https://perma.cc/YP34-ZXAM] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). The company is
currently seeking investors and lobbying in the UK for introduction of legislation "clarifying"
private rights over outer space resources. UK Space Resources Activities Bill, Asteroid
Mining Corp., https://asteroidminingcorporation.co.uk/uk-space-resources-activities-bill
[https://perma.cc/54NU-DRS7] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
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These explicit and implicit treaty interpretive efforts by commercial
actors are supported by the efforts of private associations like the
International Institute of Space Law.210 The Institute is the "global
association for space law," whose "key mission is the promotion of
further development of space law."211 Among other projects, the Institute
has prepared a white paper offering an interpretation of the Outer Space
Treaty that supports commercial use of resources.212 The white paper
builds a creative case, analogizing its interpretation to accepted
interpretations in the law of the sea,213 opining that its commerce-friendly
interpretation is "generally accepted,"214 and building an aggressively
commerce-friendly read of what may satisfy the treaty's requirement that
society must benefit from outer space activities.215
3. Nutritional Labeling
The next case study highlights an interpretive contest within a
particular national jurisdiction that attracted transnational attention from
industry actors and groups. The case study is drawn from work by Tim
Dorlach and Paul Mertensk6tter.2 16 As Dorlach and Mertensk6tter show,
Chile's attempt to introduce a new nutrition labeling regulation attracted
an onslaught of business responses at the notice-and-comment stage.217
These comments based their objections on particularly aggressive
210 International Institute of Space Law, https://iislweb.org/ [https://perma.cc/TSR7-7BLY]
(last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
211 Id.
212 International Institute of Space Law Directorate of Studies, Does International Space
Law Either Permit or Prohibit the Taking of Resources in Outer Space and on Celestial Bodies,
and How Is This Relevant for National Actors? What Is the Context, and What Are the
Contours and Limits of This Permission or Prohibition? 31 (Stephan Hobe ed., 2016),
https://iislweb.org/docs/IISLSpaceMining Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/387R-5L3L]
(industry group white paper on debate).
213 Id. at 30-31.
214 Id. at 31-35.
211 Id. at 35 (acknowledging that there must be some sort of societal benefit to commercial
use but proposing creative understandings of how these societal benefits might accrue; for
example, they could "flow to all sectors of society through spinoffs" or "a greater and deeper
understanding of space").
216 Tim Dorlach & Paul Mertensk6tter, Interpreters of International Economic Law:
Corporations and Bureaucrats in Contest over Chile's Nutrition Label, 54 Law & Soc'y Rev.
571 (2020).
211 See id. at 586-87.
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interpretations of international trade law, arguing that they prohibit front-
of-package nutrition labeling, as proposed by Chile.2 18
By way of background, Chile developed warning label regulations for
packaged food that contains a high level of sugar, saturated fat, sodium,
or calories.219 The legislation proposed that foods with the warning labels
be subject to a series of sales and marketing restrictions, such as
restrictions of sale in schools and advertising to children.220 The bill faced
resistance in the Chilean Senate and drew opposition from lobbying
groups, but it ultimately passed and went to the health ministry for
implementation.22 1 Dorlach and Mertensk6tter's story picks up at the
administrative implementation level, after the passage of this legislation,
when Chile's health ministry began a notice-and-comment period.222
Specifically, the Ministry launched an "international public consultation
procedure," as required by world trade law.223
The authors observe that the consultation procedure opened the door to
myriad transnational food industry actors, who made aggressive use of
the consultation procedure to offer their interpretations of international
trade law.22  Excluding submissions by private persons, the health
ministry received 111 comments, 92 of which were from the food
industry.225 The submissions came from industry associations, including
FoodDrinkEurope, the U.S. Grocery Manufacturers Association,
ABChile, and ConMexico, as well as individual corporations.2 26
The comments revealed a concerted influence campaign. They
universally sought to "achieve a weak or postponed implementation. "227
Their legal interpretations "often mirrored each other," and the "dominant
theme" was that the proposed regulations would violate international
economic law, most frequently trade law.228 "In total, industry made 39,
218 Id. at 590-91.
219 Id. at 571.
220 Id. at 571, 583.
221 Id. at 585.
222 Id. at 586.
223 Id. at 586-87 (explaining that the Chilean health ministry launched the consultation
procedure by giving notice of its draft implementing regulations to the World Trade
Organization, as required by the WTO's Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement).
224 Id. at 587.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 587 n.12.
227 Id. at 586.
228 Id. at 587, 587 n.12.
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often repetitious, allegations of Chile violating [World Trade
Organization ("WTO")] law."229
These interpretations of WTO law were creative outliers, "at odds with
the dominant views in the WTO's adjudication-focused, interpretive
community," according to Dorlach and Mertensk6tter.230 For example,
the comments suggested that WTO law prohibits all nutrition labels
unless they are affirmatively permitted by the Codex Alimentarius.23 1
Since the Codex at the time had no guidance on "front-of-pack nutrition
labeling," the argument was that all such labels would be prohibited.2 32 In
the authors' analysis, this interpretation of WTO law is not widely shared,
and the better argument was that the proposed Chilean regulations did not
violate the law.233
The food industry did not stop at the notice-and-comment process but
also launched a lobbying campaign. They made "many personal visits to
[the Chilean health ministry] and other Chilean regulatory officials,
during which they would put forward their 'legal concerns."'234 They
lobbied other foreign governments to try to convince them to put pressure
on Chile over the regulations.235 And they had some success in their
transnational lobbying efforts: Dorlach and Mertensk6tter found that
foreign countries adopted the food industry's outlying trade law
interpretations, revealing this by closely "echoing industry's
interpretations" in their exchanges with the Chilean government.236
Ultimately, the Chilean health ministry rejected the food industry
interpretations. The authors conclude that the Ministry "resist[ed]
interpretive capture by the food industry" by mustering its own legal
229 Id. at 587 (including the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement and the Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT") Agreement).
230 Id. (opining that the nutrition label "would most likely survive a formal challenge").
231 Id. at 590 (referring to TBT Article 2.4).
232 Id.
233 Id. at 591. The authors explain that other outlying interpretations include that the "TRIPS
Agreement grants a property right in trademarks," meaning that any regulation to restrict them
would "effectively expropriate trademark holders and therefore violate TRIPS," id. at 588,
and that Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement requires regulators to "affirmatively disqualify all
existing alternative[]" regulations that may be less trade restrictive, rather than putting the
burden of proof on any ultimate challenger to offer evidence of a suitable alternative that is
less trade restrictive, id. at 590.
234 Id. at 591.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 591-92 (observing that these outlying interpretations appeared in submissions by
foreign governments to Chile's public consultation process, and in submissions to the TBT
Committee's Specific Trade Concerns mechanism).
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expertise and coordinating with other Chilean governmental agencies to
assess whether their draft regulations comply with international law. 23 7
4. Modern Slavery
The modern slavery context is unlike the prior three examples in that,
in this case study, companies interpret international law in a reactive
posture. They are required to make an interpretation in order to fulfill
regulatory requirements. This contrasts with the assertive posture of the
prior examples, in which private actors developed interpretations in an
attempt to persuade others of a particular legal interpretation. The case
study also diverges from the prior examples in that the laws the private
actors are interpreting are customary international laws instead of treaty
provisions. It is included to demonstrate the breadth of circumstances in
which private actors take a role in interpreting international law.
The study is drawn from work by Galit Sarfaty on supply chain due
diligence. Sarfaty observes that companies have been put in a tough spot:
There is no "coherent and internationally sanctioned definition of
'modern slavery,"' but a number of jurisdictions require companies to
"report on their efforts to curb modern slavery within their supply
chains."238 The result of these laws, Sarfaty observes, is to demand that
private actors interpret "ill-defined legal norms."2 39 The interpretive
difficulty arises because there is wide consensus that customary
international laws against slavery exist but debate about their breadth and
scope:
Although the prohibition against slavery has the status of a jus
cogens norm under international law, there is considerable debate over
the definition of modern slavery. While each of the component practices
that may be included under modern slavery are defined within
international law, the broad concept is not covered under a separate
legal framework. As a result, some advocates have pushed for a flexible
interpretation that is overinclusive. . . . The popularity of modern
23 Id. at 593.
238 Galit A. Sarfaty, Translating Modern Slavery into Management Practice, 45 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 1027, 1027 (2020) (noting that these jurisdictions include, inter alia, the United




slavery as a single, cohesive, and global cause continues despite the
debate over its legal definition .... 240
Despite this interpretive debate, some jurisdictions have used disclosure
regulations to direct business attention to modern slavery.24 1 These
regulations require companies to "disclose their efforts to ensure that their
supply chains are free from slavery and human trafficking." 242 However,
the pieces of legislation Sarfaty considers leave "critical gaps in
interpretation"2 43 since "the legal norms around modern slavery are
undefined."244 These laws leave it "to corporations to determine how they
apply [them] to their supply chains."24 5
The focus of the case study for the purposes of this Article is on how
the companies affected by these laws perform this interpretive work.2 46
To do this, Sarfaty finds, companies often turn to a third-party service
provider such as the Supplier Ethical Data Exchange ("Sedex").247 Sedex
is a non-profit "platform" company, which has attracted "over fifty
thousand buyer and supplier members in 150 countries."2 48 The company
offers products to help its members comply with modern slavery
legislation by helping them "identify, measure, and manage risks in their
supply chains."2 49 In so doing, Sarfaty concludes, the company is
"excercis[ing] considerable power over decision-making and the
interpretation of legal norms."25 0
For example, Sedex has prepared a guidance document that
acknowledges ambiguity,25' then offers a variety of "operational
indicators" it has developed.252 These indicators are meant to suggest
240 Id. at 1031-32 (footnotes omitted).
241 Id. at 1032.
242 Id. at 1033.
243 Id. at 1035.
244 Id. at 1036. Safarty notes that some governments do provide a measure of guidance on
how to define this norm and are now being pushed to provide more. For example, the United
Kingdom agreed to offer more guidance on what must be disclosed. Id. at 1047.
245 Id. at 1036.
246 See id. at 1029 (noting that modern slavery is undefined both under international law and
within the legislative definitions).
247 Id.
248 Id. at 1028-29.
249 Id. at 1043.
250 Id. at 1045.
251 See id. at 1039 n.6 (noting that Sedex acknowledges the ambiguity in authoritative
international sources for the "modern slavery" norm like guidance by the International Labor
Organization).
252 Id. at 1039.
[Vol. 107:431474
Interpretive Entrepreneurs
"definite, strong, and possible" indications of forced labor.211 Sedex uses
this guidance document as the foundation for its "forced labor indicator
reports," which are reports it prepares on behalf of its customers to
"provide[] a high-level overview of the likelihood of forced labor being
present in a company's supply chain."254 Sedex will evaluate data
provided by its clients and prepare a "forced labor risk score" based on its
own weighted calculation of the indicators.255
As Sarfaty observes, the process of taking raw data from supply chain
suppliers and translating it into a risk report and score requires a process
of legal interpretation.2 6 Sedex converts ambiguous "legal norms around
modern slavery into quantitative indicators and numerical risk
scorecards"257 In so doing, the organization is exercising "considerable
power over decision-making and the interpretation of legal norms."25 8
The result, Sarfaty fears, is to "cement[] a particular definition of modern
slavery" outside of normal channels of public participation and debate.259
B. Interpretation in the Courts
This Article has so far focused on interpretation beyond the courts. This
is in part because interpretation in the courts has received much more
attention than the larger processes of interpretation outside of the courts.
However, it turns out that even interpretation by international tribunals
can be the product of interpretive entrepreneurship by private actors.
Consider the context of arbitral tribunals resolving investment
disputes. Anthea Roberts has observed that the tribunals have come to
exercise a defacto interpretive power over the treaties they apply.260 This




256 Id. at 1030.
257 Id.
251 Id. at 1045.
259 Id. at 1029.
260 Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of
Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 Harv.- Int'l L.J. 1, 6 (2014)
[hereinafter Roberts, State-to-State]; see also Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in
Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 Am. J. Int'l L. 179, 179 (2010)
("As investment treaties create broad standards rather than specific rules, they must be
interpreted before they can be applied. Investor-state tribunals have accordingly played a
critical role in interpreting, hence developing, investment treaty law.").
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reserved to the states that have made or joined them.261 This is because
the treaties offer broad standards instead of narrow rules262 and the
tribunals have informally created a system of precedent.263 These features
add up to a situation where authority has shifted away from states and
toward tribunals, Roberts asserts.264
What is less considered, but forms an essential part of this interpretive
story, is that tribunals are selecting interpretations offered to them by the
litigants. The fact that tribunals have been deferential toward private
investors means that they are selecting the interpretations offered by those
private investors instead of the interpretations proffered by the state party
to the dispute.26 As Roberts observes, arbitrators have been predisposed
to understand and accept the investor-side interpretations:
Many of the arbitrators that were appointed, particularly by investors,
evidenced a distinct commercial orientation in their profile and/or
approach, particularly compared to judges selected for other
international courts and tribunals. This led to concerns that investor-
state tribunals were interpreting broad and vague treaty language in
261 Roberts, State-to-State, supra note 260, at 11-13. Investment treaties include Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). See id.
262 Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment
Treaty System, 107 Am. J. Int'l L. 45, 76-77 (2013) [hereinafter Roberts, Clash of Paradigms]
(arguing that because "investment treaties traditionally coupled short and broadly worded
obligations with strong enforcement mechanisms . . . (for example, the promise to treat
investors fairly and equitably) ... the tribunal charged with interpreting and applying the
standard is given wide discretion").
263 Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of
States, supra note 260, at 179 (finding that the jurisprudence of the tribunals "resembles a
house of cards built largely by reference to other tribunal awards and academic opinions, with
little consideration of the views and practices of states in general or the treaty parties in
particular"); Roberts, Clash of Paradigms, supra note 262, at 77 (noting how this "lead[s] to
much investment treaty law being developed through a body of de facto precedents").
264 Anthea Roberts, Recalibrating Interpretive Authority 1 (Columbia FDI Persps., Working
Paper No. 113, 2014), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_NoI 13.pdf [https://perma.
cc/A8BK-NWQF] ("As a result, much of the content of investment treaties was forged by
tribunals, often in ways going beyond the intentions of the treaty parties.").
265 See, e.g., Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 Harv. Int'l L.J. 229, 247 (2015)
(finding that the effort of multinational corporations to secure protection of favorable
investment terms "has been helped along, to be sure, by a great many favorable interpretations
of the broad and malleable provisions incorporated in BITs and FTAs"); Roberts, State-to-
State, supra note 260, at 25 (noting concerns that "investor-state tribunals were interpreting
broad and vague treaty language in ways that were overly protective of investors' commercial
interests"). Note that the investment disputes offer a unique context in international law in
which private parties may bring disputes against nations directly. See generally Roberts, State-
to-State, supra note 260, at 2 (reviewing these circumstances).
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ways that were overly protective of investors' commercial interests and
insufficiently sensitive to states' regulatory needs.2 66
Thus, private parties have often succeeded in persuading the tribunals to
adopt investor-friendly interpretations.
Moreover, investors have, in Roberts's estimation "push[ed] for broad
interpretations of investment protections that went beyond what the treaty
parties intended or would have supported."267 Without state "control over
potential claims and arguments made by investors,"268 tribunals can
"assert and establish new legal norms, often in unintended ways." 269
States are responding to this interpretive dynamic by developing treaties
that are more precise.270 Thus, although the literature on investment
arbitration focuses on the interpretive role of the tribunal, there is an
underappreciated story here about the role of corporate lawyers doing the
interpreting.
C. Analysis
What do the case studies show about the practice of international legal
interpretation? How do they help us understand it? A treaty's meaning
and effect are not stable at the moment the treaty enters into force. That
266 Roberts, State-to-State, supra note 260, at 25 (also noting that arbitrators were "selected
by the disputing parties, rather than the treaty parties, which meant that the tribunals often
were not conscious that they were agents of the treaty parties" in performing these interpretive
functions).
267 Id.
268 Id. at 25 n. 111 (paraphrasing Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public
Law 96-99 (2007)).269 Id. (quoting Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized
Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 Int'l Org. 457, 459 (2000)).
270 Roberts, Clash of Paradigms, supra note 262, at 78 (characterizing these more precise
treaties as "second generation" investment treaties, "characterized by states seeking to
recalibrate this balance of power by increasing the specificity of their treaty commitments and
reasserting their interpretive rights as treaty parties").
The fact that investment treaty arbitration offers considerable room for interpretive contests
by the litigants has also inspired non-governmental organizations and respondent states to try
to introduce outside norms into the interpretive process, demonstrating that the interpretations
that prevail are products of lively contests for meaning. See, e.g., Stephen W. Schill, The
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and International Investment Agreements:
Converging Universes, in 40 Years of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 63,
70-76 (Nicola Bonucci & Catherine Kessedjian eds., 2018) (exploring how respondent states
and non-governmental organizations as amici have raised environmental, human rights, and
corporate accountability standards in investment arbitrations to try to convince investment
tribunals to interpret investment treaty obligations in reference to those standards).
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moment simply ends one chapter in a process of legal development and
begins the next. As the case studies show, actors engage in the interpretive
process to try to shape how an international law is interpreted in domestic
legislation, regulations, judicial proceedings, popular opinion, or all of the
above. The case studies show that business actors and groups are among
the participants in these interpretive processes. They also show a range of
intended audiences, or targets of this interpretation, and an array of ways
that actors use legal tools to participate in the interpretive contest. The
following Subsections take these features in turn.
1. Who Interprets?
The case studies offer information about at least some of the actors
involved in interpretive contests. The industry or trade organization is a
major actor across several of our case studies. Industry and trade
organizations are usually formally organized as not-for-profit entities.271
They exist to serve their membership, which is a group of business entities
organized around a particular identity, usually a sector, region, or both.272
Previous research has suggested that trade associations are organized to
ensure that "collective action can be taken on common problems."273 Our
case studies how that legal interpretation is one of the common problems
to which these entities direct effort.
Our case studies feature many instances of industry associations
coordinating an interpretive campaign. For example, in the food labeling
context, the interpretive campaign advanced through "nationally cloaked
industry associations all around the world." 27 4 The associations were
existing groups used as mouthpieces to "allow[] corporations to amplify
their self-interested interpretations" through the notice-and-comment
process.275 In the aircraft financing context, the Aviation Working Group
was not an existing industry group but was instead founded by Boeing
and Airbus for the express purpose of developing law in this area. The
Group now serves a wider range of members in the aircraft finance sector
271 Michael L. Barnett, One Voice, But Whose Voice? Exploring What Drives Trade
Association Activity, 52 Bus. & Soc'y 213, 221 (2012).
272 See id. at 213-14 (describing trade associations). See generally Sarah Dadush, The
Internal Challenges of Associational Governance, 111 AJIL Unbound 125, 125 (2017)
(analyzing relationships between trade associations and their members).
273 Barnett, supra note 271, at 214 (internal citation omitted).
274 Dorlach & Mertenskotter, supra note 216, at 600.
275 Id.
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but maintains its link to the founders and the agenda they set, and it has
turned its attention to interpretation.2 76 The outer space case study also
features an industry association articulating a business-friendly
international legal interpretation, but in a more passive mode than some
of the other case studies. In this context, individual business actors lobby
on their own behalves rather than through an association. Perhaps this is
because the industry is less established than industries in the other case
studies.277 In the modern slavery example, the association engages its
membership by offering its interpretive services for sale as a non-profit
business.278 Sarfaty calls Sedex a "platform" company, which "create[s]
value by facilitating exchanges of information and creating networks of
users."279 The company employs technical experts rather than legal
experts, enlarging the interpretive community addressing modern slavery
beyond lawyers to "business professionals," mostly from the United
Kingdom.280
2. To What Audiences?
The audiences in our case studies are almost exclusively legislative and
administrative officials, judges, and the public rather than the audience
one might expect-the treaty parties themselves, through their executive
branch officials, whose statements about treaty meaning are entitled to
significant weight in international and domestic law.281 The audiences are
those who have power to give meaning to the treaty in specific narrow
contexts or to confer reputational benefits on the interpreter.
276 See discussion supra at Subsection H.A.1.
277 This would be a productive question for further research. After all, "we have little
systematic understanding" of trade associations and "[t]he lack of research . . . is lamentable."
Barnett, supra note 271, at 214.
278 See discussion supra at Subsection II.A.4.
279 Sarfaty, supra note 238, at 1028.
280 Id. at 1029. The impact of platform businesses is an emerging area of scholarly attention;
this case study shows that one productive target for further analysis is their impacts on law
through legal interpretation. See id.
281 See Moloo, Subsequent Party Conduct, supra note 72, at 57-78 (evaluating what
subsequent conduct is relevant to treaty interpretation according to the Vienna Convention);
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 326 (Am. L. Inst.
1987) (instructing U.S. courts to "give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive
Branch"); Johnstone, Interpretive Communities, supra note 99, at 385 (defining the principal
interpretive community for a treaty is "interpreters directly responsible for the conclusion and
implementation of a particular treaty").
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National Legislators. The Aviation Working Group wants national
legislators to implement the Cape Town Convention according to its
guidelines, ensuring in particular that the treaty takes priority over
national law. In the outer space context, business actors lobby legislators
to adopt domestic legislation that takes an aggressive interpretive position
on whether mining of outer space materials is permitted under the treaty.
National Administrative Regulators. In the food labeling context, the
multinational food industry wanted Chilean regulators to adopt an
interpretation of international trade law that would cause them to drop a
labeling requirement. In the modern slavery example, Sedex helps firms
interpret international legal norms in order to disclose to regulators that
they have performed with adequate diligence.
Arbitral Tribunals and National Courts. In the context of investment
disputes, investors are in the unusual position of being able to advance an
interpretive position about the meaning of the treaty directly before an
international tribunal. In the aviation financing context, part of the
working group's strategy is to file amicus briefs before national courts
advancing its view of the "correct" interpretations of the Cape Town
Convention in given matters.
Public Opinion. A final set of interpretive audiences in our case studies
comprises peers, consumers, potential regulators, or others who may give
a reputational or economic benefit to the interpreter.282 For example, the
Aviation Working Group is preparing a compliance index to advertise
national compliance.2 83 The working group has not disclosed the intended
audience for this index, but one may assume it is meant to function
through reputational effects. In the modern slavery context, the audiences
for required disclosures are not just national regulators but also a firm's
shareholders and other members of the public who have access to the
disclosures.284
3. With What Tools?
How do these interpretations interact with the apparatus of the law?
That is, how do legal tools facilitate these interpretive processes or how
282 See Kishanthi Parella, The Information Regulation of Business Actors, 111 AJIL
Unbound 130, 130 (2017) (finding that business actors associate with reputable organizations
as they seek to avoid negative reputational consequences).
283 See supra Subsection II.A.1.
284 See Sarfaty, supra note 238, at 1048 (noting that the disclosures are meant to allow
stakeholders to "evaluate and compare corporate performance").
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does this interpretation affect the law? This question offers the most
purchase for questions about what potential reforms and responses may
be possible. The case studies identified in this Article cast a wide net,
including both diverse subjects and diverse tools of interpretation. That
diversity encompasses a range of points of intersection with legal
processes. There are likely additional modes of interpretation in case
studies not collected in this Article, but this Article captures four.
First, in the modern slavery context, a regulatory disclosure scheme
that requires compliance reporting requires private actors to make
interpretive choices about content of an ambiguous international legal
norm. This is an interpretation required or initiated by the state.
Second, the investment dispute and aviation financing examples both
show private actors advancing their interpretations before courts. In the
investment dispute context, this is as a party in an international tribunal,
and in the aviation financing example, this is as a friend of the court in
cases before domestic courts. In both circumstances, the interpretation is
facilitated or empowered by the state through the apparatus of the courts.
Similarly, in the food labeling context, private interpreters are targeting
an administrative agency through its notice-and-comment procedure to
try to get the agency to adopt the private sector interpretation in order to
defeat disfavored domestic regulations. This also reflects state-facilitated
interpretive behavior.
Third, the aviation financing and outer space examples show lobbying
of domestic legislators or administrative officials. In these case studies,
private interpreters use traditional tools of lobbying to share views with
the legislature in order to make sure that domestic law interprets and
implements the international treaty in a particular way. This is
interpretation aimed at state response.
Finally, a last mode of interpretation is interpretation that is fully
independent of the state. It may serve to change the regulatory
environment in which a state operates, but it is neither aimed at complying
with the law nor is it explicitly aimed at developing or changing the law.
For example, in the outer space context, private space companies are
launching disruptive business models that depend on a particular
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty. They broadcast these business
plans in the popular press, on their websites, and through an industry
association. These modes of publicizing this activity could, as in the
Pollman and Barry model, help bring public support to an interpretation,
4812021 ]
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changing the regulatory environment in which any further interpretations
are made.285
To organize the four modes of interpretation it may be helpful to
conceptualize them as arranged along a spectrum that reflects the degree
of interaction with the state.286 Interpretive processes that take place
purely in response to state interpretation would fall to one end. They are
"state initiated." Interpretive processes that seem to be purely or largely
indifferent to state regulation would take place at the other end of the
spectrum. While these interpretations may ultimately affect state
behavior, they do not immediately interact with the state:
State Initiated Independent of State
Figure 1
In between those two extremes lie interpretations that have various
degrees of interaction with the state, like state-empowered interpretations
and those directed at the state. We can organize our case studies along this
spectrum:
Modes Case studies
State Initiated Modern slavery (to comply with regulation)
Investment disputes (for investment tribunal)
State Empowered Aviation financing (via amicus briefs 
in domestic
court)
Food labeling (in a notice-and-comment procedure)
Targeted at State Aviation financing (to domestic 
legislature)
Outer space (to domestic legislature)
Independent of Outer space (in court of public opinion)
State _________________________
Figure 2
285 Pollman & Barry, supra note 2, at 384-85.
286 Note that this spectrum is not intended to suggest hat some strategies are more effective
than others, but merely to simplify and organize a wide range of activity.
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These observations about how the interpretation interacts with the
apparatus of the state help organize and evaluate implications.
4. With What Effects?
Finally, what is the effect of interpretive entrepreneurship by business
actors? In other words, how effective are business actors at establishing
the interpretations they seek, and what do we know about when they are
more and less effective? While the case studies do not offer sufficient
information to develop a systematic answer to this question, they do
permit some preliminary observations and hypotheses.
First, we know that business actors are not always successful at
establishing their preferred interpretation. In the food labeling context,
Dorlach and Mertensk5tter attribute their failure to the education and
training of the officials who were the targets of the interpretive campaign.
This lack of success may also have to do with the narrowness of the
context. In other words, did the food industry lose the battle but win the
war? The authors suggest that other governments may have already
adopted the food industry interpretation, as evidenced by their own
submissions in the Chilean notice-and-comment procedure.
In other contexts, such as aviation financing and the dispute over the
meaning of "appropriation" in the Outer Space Treaty, interpretive
entrepreneurs appear to have achieved much more success. In the former
context, there is no evidence of any organized resistance to the aviation
industry's interpretive campaign. In the latter example, the acceleration
of private space programs suggests that resistance to the interpretation has
been ineffective. These successes permit hypotheses about the usefulness
to interpretive entrepreneurs of a multi-pronged persuasive strategy, the
significance of organized resistance, and perhaps the importance of
persistence over time.
In other contexts, while private interpretations may have initially taken
hold, those private interpretive campaigns have led to reactions by
governments that diminish the space for interpretive debates. In the
context of bilateral investment treaties, states have increased the precision
of many "second generation" treaties so that there is less interpretive
space for private parties to exploit. In the context of modern slavery, some
governments have begun to issue guidance about what falls within that
rubric, diminishing the role of private parties in constructing that norm in
their mandated disclosures. These examples support the hypothesis that
interpretive entrepreneurship will be a more common phenomenon in
48320211]
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circumstances of ambiguity and that the precision of a norm will diminish
the prevalence or effectiveness of that behavior.
There is much more work to be done in determining the effect of these
interpretive campaigns and studying the factors that contribute to their
success or failure. Nevertheless, because interpretive entrepreneurship
has not received systematic attention as a discrete phenomenon, even a
brief introduction may help guide further analysis and suggest an array of
implications. The next Part turns to those.
III. PosT Hoc LAWMAKING AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS
As this Article has shown, there is a potentially vast amount of
underexplored interpretive activity that contributes to the development of
international law. Because this interpretive behavior has not received
sustained attention, it is ripe for further analysis. Yet even this preliminary
treatment reveals an array of potential implications. The account
contributes to our understanding of the process of international
lawmaking. In doing so, it contributes to analysis of the contributions and
challenges of non-state actors, particularly business actors, and suggests
that the interpretive process likely matters to the construction of
international law. It informs and challenges theoretical positions on the
process of interpretation, and finally, helps identify potential reforms.
A. Post Hoc Lawmaking
One way to understand the interpretive activity in the case studies is as
an extended process of lawmaking that reaches beyond the legislative
moment. This in turn suggests that lobbying is not only a pre-legislative
concern but also a post-legislative phenomenon.
1. Interpretation as Lawmaking
The interpretive activity in the case studies shows an extended process
of lawmaking that continues after a treaty enters into force or a customary
norm is crystalized. I call this "post hoc" lawmaking. In other words, the
intention of interpretive entrepreneurship in at least some of the case
studies is to further develop the meaning of international legal rules.
Part of the reason that lawmaking processes continue after the
legislative moment is that international legal doctrine facilitates this
continuation. Specifically, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
specifies that treaties may be interpreted in light of "any subsequent
484 [Vol. 107:431
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practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation."287 According to commentators,
this is "a most important element"288 or the "best evidence"289 of treaty
interpretation.
To determine the meaning of a treaty, interpreters can thus consider
evidence of the intention of the parties that arises after the treaty is
concluded.290 This includes activity at the implementation stage as well
as the interpretation stage. Andrea Wang has recently described how
treaty implementation is a dynamic process that can cause informal
change to treaty meaning.291 Given these processes, treaties may be
described as "departure points for further bargaining among implementers
as constraints and opportunities reveal themselves over time."292 The
descriptive account of this Article confirms and extends that hypothesis.
For example, the aviation financing example shows the Aviation Working
Group directing attention to the implementation process by working with
governments around the world. This Article also enlarges Wang's account
by showing that these lawmaking efforts do not end even at the
implementation stage but rather continue on to interpretive struggles
occurring much later. The outer space case study is the best example of
this, as actors address their interpretive efforts to a treaty that entered into
force over half a century ago.2 93
While post hoc lawmaking could be significant at any point in history,
it may be particularly significant in the current moment of "uncertainty,
contest, and change."2 94 Obstacles to multilateral treaty making and
enforcement seem more intractable than ever.295 In a context such as this,
interpretive contests over existing treaty law may do more work in
287 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 23, at art. 31, ¶ 3(b).
288 Aust, supra note 58, at 241.
289 Gardiner, supra note 58, at 253. Subsequent practice is also "well-established in the
jurisprudence of international tribunals." Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), Judgment,
1999 I.C.J. 1045, ¶ 49 (Dec. 13) (quoting Int'l L. Comm'n, Reps. on the Work of Its
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Sessions, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1, ¶ 15 (1966)).
290 Gardiner, supra note 58, at 253 (noting that subsequent practice in treaty interpretation
"is one of the features of the Vienna rules which marks out a difference from the approach
taken in some legal systems to interpretation of legal texts of purely domestic origin").
291 Wang, supra note 29, at 834-35.
292 Id. at 879.
293 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 188 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967).
294 Hakimi, supra note 115, at 1492.




updating the law for current circumstances than major new multilateral
agreements.296 It is especially important in this context to understand how
these interpretive contests unfold, and who participates in them, for what
purposes, and with what effects.
2. Interpretation as Lobbying
If interpretation is part of the process of international lawmaking, it is
not entirely surprising that it is also a target of focused lobbying efforts.
Recognizing that international legal interpretation is also subject to
lobbying efforts expands current accounts of lobbying, offers analytical
clarity, and suggests regulatory responses borrowed from national
lobbying theory and jurisprudence, as well as frameworks for reform
developed by international bodies.297
While the case studies in this analysis do not focus on the intentions of
the interpretive entrepreneurs, these intentions seem clear from the nature
of their activity, at least in some circumstances. Interpretive entrepreneurs
seek to ensure their interpretations will prevail in various contests for
meaning. Consider aircraft financing.298 The Aviation Working Group's
intention is to disseminate its interpretations as broadly as possible around
the world to ensure a particular and consistent interpretation of the Cape
Town Convention. The Group's strategies as well as the breadth of its
efforts reveal this purpose. The Group offers implementation guidance,
model legislation, and free consultations to government officials who
choose to take advantage of them, and it has formed relationships with
governments and law firms around the world to advance these goals. The
Group's compliance project and use of amicus briefs in domestic court
cases serve as further efforts to advance its interpretations of the treaty
worldwide.
Ensuring that an interpretation is widely accepted can bring regulatory
stability and certainty, and it can allow the industry a permissive
regulatory environment in which to develop a business model.299 The
outer space example best demonstrates this point. Industry actors have
lobbied Congress to ensure that their definition of "appropriation" in the
296 See Moloo, Changing Times?, supra note 35, at 261 (suggesting that treaty interpretation
can adapt treaties to changing circumstances).
297 See Durkee, supra note 31, at 1788-96 (exploring proposals for lobbying reform by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and other sources).
298 See supra Subsection II.Al.
299 See supra Subsection II.A.2.
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Outer Space Treaty prevails in U.S. legislation and policy, and they push
the United States to advance this interpretation with international
counterparts. At the same time, these actors litigate their case in the court
of public opinion. The interpretive campaign in the outer space context
may appear less concerted than the campaign in the aviation financing
example because it is conducted by a range of actors rather than
coordinated through a central industry group. But even if the effort is not
coordinated, its message is: Outer Space Treaty interpreters should adopt
a commerce-friendly reading of "appropriation."
As these case studies show, the lobbying efforts are directed toward a
range of officials, including domestic legislators, regulators, and judges
at both the international and domestic levels. The food labeling example
rounds out the set.300 It is aimed at persuading a particular group of
ministerial regulators to adopt a reading of the law. The transnational
nature of this campaign implies that food industry actors saw the
campaign as a global one. Perhaps they feared a wider spread of the
Chilean regulators' interpretive choices.
While legal scholarship has not focused on international legal
interpretation as a site of lobbying influence, the opportunity it presents
has not been lost on the business community. As the vice president of a
large trade association observed, "You can often accomplish through
implementation what you were not able to accomplish through
negotiation of the actual agreement."30'
Understanding interpretation as lobbying also challenges the once-
popular conception that non-state actor participation is a "democratizing"
influence on global governance.302 This view, which I have called the
"legitimacy optimist" view, asserts that non-state actors can contribute to
the legitimacy of international legal rules by representing a "global
constituency" not mediated through particular governments.303 In this
view global governance is more representative and democratic when non-
300 See supra Subsection II.A.3.
301 A Private Sector View of International Trade Negotiations, 91 Am. Soc'y Int'l. L. Proc.
89, 91 (1997) (remarks of Maureen Smith, Vice President for International Affairs, American
Forest and Paper Association).
302 See Durkee, supra note 31, at 1742.
303 Id. at 1759 (citing Kenneth Anderson, Global Governance: The Problematic Legitimacy
Relationship Between Global Civil Society and the United Nations 16 (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll.
L. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-71, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1265839
[https://perma.cc/PE76-5ZL8] (for a description of this position)).
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governmental organizations participate in rulemaking processes.304 The
case studies in this Article show that beyond rulemaking, non-state actors
are also involved in interpretive campaigns, and these actors are not
always the public interest organizations one may expect.305 What the case
studies show is that at least some actors in the interpretive contests do not
even purport to represent some conception of "the public" but instead the
interests of a particular industry sector. This is lobbying activity and
should be analyzed and potentially regulated for what it is.
3. Interpretation as Disruptive Influence
Scholars of the gig economy have observed that some startups stake
out their business models on the prospect of legal change, and then set
about trying to accomplish that change.3 06 These companies are not just
business disruptors but also legal disruptors. The case studies show that
these efforts at legal disruption take place internationally as well. For
example, space companies are currently broadcasting their plans to
launch, extract, and sell outer space resources based on a controversial
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty. They are trying to ensure this
interpretation prevails by marketing the benefits of their business plans to
nations, the market, and in the court of public opinion. By so doing, they
force their home states and others into a reactive posture. Any new
regulations that take a position on the meaning of the Outer Space Treaty
do so with heightened stakes because these regulations will either
facilitate or quash the intentions of an array of active businesses. If the
U.S. experience with Uber, Airbnb, and other platform disruptors offers
any guidance, those heightened stakes may increase the likelihood that
the disruptors will prevail. This question is worthy of further
investigation. In any case, when private actors assert an interpretation and
very publicly act on it, they change the status quo against which states
make any further interpretive choices.
304 Durkee, supra note 31, at 1759.
305 See Tobin, supra note 26, at 1-4 (recognizing that public interest non-governmental
organizations participate in interpreting human rights treaties; proposing ways for them to do
so more effectively).
306 Pollman & Barry, supra note 2, at 384-85.
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B. Research Agenda
The case studies highlighted in this Article show a variety of different
methods by which private actors get involved in advancing interpretations
of international law. They tend to confirm the critical and constructivist
views that, in practice, the meaning of a text is constructed through power
or persuasion within communities. However, these case studies likely
represent only the tip of an iceberg of interpretive behavior lurking below
the surface of scholarly attention, which should be of interest to a variety
of scholarly approaches.
Critical Approaches. For those who think interpretation reflects the
agenda and power of the interpreters, the identities and agendas of the
interpreters are important characteristics that help determine the outcome
of the interpretive process. In other words, for critical theorists, the
identity of the interpreters should matter if interpretation is a tool of
power. Critical theorists will want to know whose voices dominate and
what are the levers of persuasion. The case studies offer fodder for the
critical insight that corporate power has influence within international law
and also bring that insight out of theoretical abstraction into real-world
contexts. In a world where financial power can translate into persuasive
power and financial power is frequently located in the Global North and
in the private sector, the meanings that stick might be the meanings
backed by capital, which are also the meanings that entrench capital.
Retrievalism. The case studies tend to challenge the retrievalist notion
that the meaning of a text can be discovered, as in a hunt for buried
treasure. In practice, actors behave as though meaning is constructed
through a process of persuasion. In any case, for a retrievalist, the
identities of the interpreters and non-judicial sites of interpretation should
matter if the process of interpretation corrupts meaning or moves it out of
the ambit of national sovereignty or delegated authority. A retrievalist will
want to know: Are private interpreters playing by the rules, or are they
degrading the integrity of international law by promoting corrupt
interpretations? Are they competing with sovereigns or displacing
authoritative interpretations? The case studies offer some initial
observations that might satisfy these questions, but they are preliminary
and anecdotal. The principal value of this analysis to a retrievalist is in its
suggestion regarding where further research may help address these
questions.
Constructivism. For the constructivists, the identity of the interpreters
should matter because legal meaning develops within interpretive
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communities, and so that meaning will reflect the understandings,
agendas, and normative priors of that community. A constructivist should
want to know who populates the relevant interpretive community to have
an idea of the norms within that community. Moreover, constructivists
view interpretation as a persuasive endeavor. If an interpretation becomes
authoritative because the relevant community accepts it, then who is
persuading, and how? What this Article shows is that the interpretive
community may also include private actors, and these tools of persuasion
may also be used to lobby for corporate causes.
A constructivist will also want to understand how legal meaning may
fragment and consolidate within and across interpretative communities.
The case studies show that divergent interpretive communities are not
always in conversation with each other. In the space law context, for
example, two sets of interpretive communities have produced different
answers as to how the non-appropriation norm of the Outer Space Treaty
should be interpreted.307 Since these interpretations are occurring in
different communities largely siloed from each other, advocates on both
sides affirm that there is no longer any debate.30 8 Conversely, the presence
of private sector actors in interpretive communities can also consolidate
legal meaning. In the aircraft financing example, the Aviation Working
Group has undertaken to ensure a consistent worldwide interpretation of
the Cape Town Convention.309
Each of these conclusions is preliminary, but they suggest productive
avenues for future research and the importance of this area of study.
Further research could also address questions about whether private
sector interpreters offer a pure public good in developing international
legal meaning or corrupt meaning for individual private ends. It could
address whether the participation of private groups might increase or
decrease the input and output legitimacy of legal rules, building on
literatures that address these questions in the context of non-governmental
organizations and lawmaking.3 1 0 By opening the black box of
307 See supra Subsection II.A.2.
308 See id.
309 See supra Subsection II.A.1.
310 See, e.g., Abbott & Gartner, supra note 129, at 26 (examining these questions); Daniel
Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 Yale
L.J. 1490, 1498 (2006) (same); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 15, 18 (2005) (same).
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international legal interpretation, this Article lays the groundwork for
systematic approaches to these questions.
Other Approaches. Those approaches should be of interest to scholars
working in a variety of traditions. One of the intellectual forebears of this
Article's approach is the liberal theory movement in international law and
relations, which conceives of the state as the agent of interest groups, but
which has focused on lawmaking and compliance, and not on
interpretation.311 Other approaches that concern themselves with the
relationship between private behavior and the law include the
transnational legal network and regulatory intermediary accounts
reviewed earlier in this Article.312 They also include the New Haven
School, which conceives of international law as decision processes
unconstrained by classic tests of legality;313 global legal pluralism, which
views law as a contest between competing normative orders, which are
both publicly and privately generated;314 and transnational legal ordering,
which uses a socio-legal approach to investigate the life cycles of
normative orders.31s This Article's approach also fits within a new,
emerging literature that has not yet attracted an organizing label but that
is concerned with how legal processes function in practice, how actors
affect those processes, and, generally, how international law is constituted
by the behavior and interactions of its participants.316 It also relates to the
3" See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra note 31, at 513 (explaining liberal theory in international
relations); Brewster, supra note 31, at 502 (showing how interest group lobbying at the
national level shapes national approaches to international law); see also Benvenisti, supra note
31, at 170-72 (conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent of small interest groups).
3 See supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
313 See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, The New
Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32 Yale J. Int'l L. 575, 575-77 (2007) (offering a brief
primer on the New Haven School approach).
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eds., 2021) (highlighting a "behavioral approach" to legal scholarship); Hakimi, supra note
115, at 1489 (taking a process-based approach to customary international aw); Wang, supra
note 29, at 828 (analyzing treaty implementation as a product of domestic interactions); Harlan
Grant Cohen, International Precedent and the Practice of International Law, in Negotiating
State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism 172, 174-75
(Michael A. Helfand ed., 2015) (taking a "communities of practice" approach to accounts of
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recent surge of scholarly interest in international law as the product of a
professional cadre of lawyers.317 Interpretive contests that involve private
actors should be of interest to each of these schools.
C. Reforms
A final reason to pay attention to the actual on-the-ground processes of
interpretation is that this descriptive analysis helps to identify and
evaluate potential responses. Interpretive entrepreneurship in each of its
instantiations fundamentally offers its audiences three options: to adopt,
reject, or refrain from responding to the privately developed meaning.
Unless those audiences reject an interpretation, as the national regulators
did in the context of the nutritional labeling case study, interpretive
entrepreneurship can lead to formal or informal entrenchment of the
entrepreneurial interpretation.
Even if governmental officials do reject a private interpretation, their
choice to do so can sometimes unfold in the context of altered stakes and
the entrepreneurial shadow. For example, any new national-level
interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty now unfold in the context of a
substantial, entrenched space industry, which has developed on the
prospect of commercial use of outer space resources.
How, then, might officials respond to interpretive entrepreneurship?
The available responses depend on the context. Nations can
hypothetically wrest control of the interpretive process by clarifying the
text of a treaty itself, but this will only be possible in some contexts. It
will likely be much more possible in the context of bilateral agreements
like investment treaties than in the context of multilateral treaties like the
Outer Space Treaty, where the prospects for a new agreement are remote.
In the context of new treaty projects, the case studies clarify that treaty
texts begin, but do not end, the process of lawmaking. Treaty drafters
should pay attention to the potential interpretive battles a treaty will attract
when they make drafting choices like selecting a rule or standard. In any
13 (2017) (examining the UN Commission on International Trade Law as the "site of struggles
for influence and power").
317 See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International? 1 (2017) (examining how
"different national communities of international lawyers construct their understandings of
international law"); Lianne J.M. Boer & Sofia Stolk, Backstage Practices of Transnational
Law, in Backstage Practices of Transnational Law 1, 2 (Lianne J.M. Boer & Sofia Stolk eds.,
2019) (exploring the "practices, habits and routines that make up the lives of those involved
in the field of transnational aw").
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context, of course, nations can take a proactive role in asserting their
chosen treaty interpretations by passing national legislation or making
public statements through state departments or at international institutions
like the United Nations, thus contributing to the "subsequent practice"
that helps define a treaty over time.
In the context of the food labeling regulations, Dorlach and
Mertenskitter propose that governments could ensure that their
administrative or ministerial level regulators are trained in relevant
international laws so they are able to critically evaluate the interpretations
directed their way. In the modern slavery context, the reform seems rather
simple: regulators could refrain from demanding compliance with a norm
they do not define. Such a reform would ensure that legal meaning is
developed in democratic contexts with rule of law protections such as
transparency and reason-giving rather than in the contexts of commercial
expediency. In short, the case studies show an array of potential
responses, though this, too, is a productive area for further study.
CONCLUSION
The moments subject to serious scrutiny in international law are the
major lawmaking moments, when a treaty is adopted, or a customary
international legal norm is identified. This Article has revealed a
potentially vast array of more subtle lawmaking moments that occur when
interpreters battle over the meaning of a rule. This Article argues that
these moments matter too.
The process of interpretation is important because interpretation drives
legal development. It is particularly important in the twenty-first century
context in which multilateral lawmaking is a vanishing art but global
problems persist and intensify. In this context, interpretive
entrepreneurship is likely to continue and grow as private actors try to
define and redefine the laws on the books. Interpretive entrepreneurs
engage in interpretive campaigns to claim legitimacy, avoid legal
scrutiny, and use the power of the state to secure their aims. At the same
time, conventional arguments over interpretive rules and doctrines miss,
and will tend to mask, these messy real-world interpretive battles. So, too,
will accounts of legal interpretation that focus on the courts. As this
Article shows, law also develops through these obscure, untidy, quotidian
interpretive struggles, which nevertheless determine the fate of important
legal norms.
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